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Climate change has a global impact on all sectors of life including politics and the 
economy; health and food security, social justice and media. There are stark 
contrasts in the political and scientific debates on climate change. The economic 
impacts have already gripped the attention of both the political elite and science 
community, who also recognise the threats on the survival of the human population. 
Recent global climate change meetings such as the COPs are an indication that 
politics, and not necessarily science, is at the centre of this environmental challenge. 
In politics, policy debates are arguments over actions. It is therefore important to 
understand how the SA government communicates climate change given its status 
as a leading force in Africa and its insurmountable socio-economic challenges.  With 
a theoretical understanding of Moral Foundation Theory, Steve Vanderheiden’s 
political theory that addresses climate change justice and framing theory and textual 
analysis, the researcher analyses President Jacob Zuma’s climate change speeches 
during COP to identify master narratives, given the president’s visibility and political 
direction at these high level meetings. This dissertation contributes to the lack of 
scholarship on how the president communicates climate change within the 
communication field and general shortage of presidential rhetoric in Africa. Zuma’s 
rhetoric on climate change indicates that SA’s priority is economic development and 
this will not be compromised by climate change policy that halts growth in developing 
nations. Zuma is clear that common but differentiated responsibilities must remain 
the cornerstone of climate change policy, if fairness, balance and equity are to be 
realised. He stands by this argument despite growing GHG emissions from some of 
the developing nations, including South Africa. 
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Chapter one: Introduction 
 
The scientific evidence is compelling – for almost a century C02 and other GHGs 
have accumulated in the earth’s atmosphere. The evidence indicates that human-
induced behaviour is the reason for the accumulation. The planet has experienced 
extreme weather conditions from droughts to melting arctic ice, wildfires to severe 
flooding. With an estimated 150 000 climate change related deaths annually, 
according to the World Health Organization, this environmental challenge poses a 
serious problem now and for future generations.  
But the global scientific community believes that technologies are available to 
address climate change. How can we come together to address this challenge that 
has become a political issue in SA as one of the key players at least in representing 
the global South rhetoric? Climate change is a complex issue and is no longer a 
“technical problem requiring technical solutions”.  
Climate change has a global impact on all sectors of life including politics and the 
economy; health and food security, social justice and media (Cortés, 2014; Saleh, 
2012; Dankelman, 2010). There are stark contrasts in the political and scientific 
debates on climate change. Recent global climate change meetings such as the 
COPs are an indication that politics, and not necessarily science, is at the centre of 
this environmental challenge. In politics, policy debates are arguments over actions 
(Dessler & Parson, 2006). 
The ramifications of climate change are immense and affect peoples’ security around 
the world. The economic impacts have already gripped the attention of both the 
political elite and science community, who also recognise the threats on the survival 
of the human population (Stern, 2007).  
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Several expected consequences of climate change include, water scarcity, sea 
levels rising, food security challenges and an increase in natural disasters. It is 
expected that violent conflicts over sacred resources will occur and that climate-
related migration will continue (Dimitrov, 2010).  
The complexity of presidential rhetoric of climate change can be found in institutional 
contexts and power positions. Presidents across the globe face the challenge of 
balancing their climate change rhetoric with their respective countries’ policies. 
Building on studies on US rhetorical presidency, the researcher strives to offer an 
understanding of how the SA presidency navigates the climate change spectrum 
while considering its moral and practical positions (Widmaier & Grube, 2014). 
SA, although developed compared to most African countries, are faced with the 
similar vulnerabilities, amplified by climate change. However, the country is also 
known for being the largest contributor of GHGs emissions, mainly because of it the 
source of its powers continues to be coal-based (Chagutah, 2009). The SA 
government has conceded that the climate change is a global problem that requires 
committed action from all nations. Through proposed policy, government aims to 
reduce its GHG emissions while simultaneously addressing pressing needs such as 
poverty, unemployment and rural development (The Government of the Republic of 
South Africa, 2011). 
With its decisive climate change policy action evolving on the home front, the SA 
government also enjoyed prominence in the international arena by hosting the 
COP17 in Durban in 2011. The State’s roles in different coalitions of developing 




It’s only in the past 20 years that the political and economic dimensions of climate 
change have been accentuated because for a long time, climate change was 
communicated as a scientific problem (Taderera, 2010 & Moser, 2007). There is a 
body of literature which allows for one to understand the public’s attitude towards 
climate change and trends in public opinion. Important to note, Hart (2011) 
demonstrated that a thematic framing of climate change issues made people support 
policies to address it as opposed to those exposed to episodic frames. 
This growing knowledge also present challenges and opportunities for approaching 
communication on climate change (Moser, 2007). It thus becomes vital to 
understand how government communicates climate change, given South Africa’s 
status as a leading force in Africa. And as well as its insurmountable challenges of 
poverty, inequality and unemployment described by President Jacob Zuma has the 
triple threat (Zuma, 2012).  
The analysis of how the presidency and high-level political figures communicate 











The Presidency and communication  
Rhetoric and persuasion go hand in hand because a leader’s ability to persuade an 
audience lies in his or her ability to employ appropriate rhetorical tactics. If the 
speaker can persuade then he has used rhetoric successfully. Persuasion is 
described as an interactive communicative process. If a president is to influence the 
constituents or other stakeholders’ beliefs, attitudes and behaviour, then his or her 
messages must comply with the wants and their needs. In democracies it is then 
incumbent that for a leader to attract people through his or her policies and the role 
of rhetoric should not be understated (Alo, 2010). 
Before delving into the scholarship on presidential rhetoric from the US, it is worth 
noting that there is a growing interest in moving towards a clear-cut definition and 
consolidation of African rhetoric. In Nigeria the interest in rhetoric studies is evident 
and in other parts of Africa research is published on rhetoric related themes. There is 
an absence of studies to identify which rhetorical strategies were employed by 
African leaders that have brought about political change on the continent. In fact, it is 
urged that we think about how African rhetoric is conceived (Alo, 2010). 
For decades scholars of the presidency, many of whom find their academics homes 
in the departments of political science or government focused their research on two 
out of the three general areas of power available to presidents. The first of the two 
powers referred to the constitutional and statutory power courtesy of a Constitution. 





The third power with public opinion occasionally received attention until Richard 
Neustadt’s Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership was published. Here, he 
addressed the “person as one among many in a set of institutions” rather than the 
office. His contributions moved away from the number of books written on all aspects 
of the presidency. There was a quick and wide response to Neustadt’s work because 
it went beyond descriptions of the presidential office and institutional studies. 
Scholars started to integrate the “president-as-persuader”, moving away from the 
formal legal powers or the political powers of the office as the main focus (Windt, 
1986).  
It is argued that even scholars of International Relations and comparative politics 
saw rhetoric as a secondary consideration until it was returned to the centre of 
political analysis mainly through persuasion. The role of rhetoric in processes and 
outcomes is therefore of great significance (Krebs & Jackson, 2007). 
Medhurst (1996) stated both scholars of the presidency and rhetoric have intellectual 
traditions that date back to Aristotle. Scholars of rhetoric, often residing in their 
academic homes in departments of speech or communication, speak to Aristotle’s 
rhetoric while the scholars of the presidency speak endear themselves to his politics. 
For rhetoricians, Neustadt's work meant that presidential rhetoric could now find 
shelter within the discipline of presidential studies (Windt, 1986).  
With the advent of technological advances in media, presidents could speak to the 
people instantaneously and directly.  Presidential speeches have been increasingly 




Presidents could be heard on radio or seen on television and nowadays presidents 
make the daily news on television stations, all which make it seem as if people have 
constant access to presidents (Ceaser et al., 1981 & Stuckey, 2010). People are no 
longer just an audience for presidential rhetoric and the “presidential words are no 
longer something apart from us” (Stuckey, 2010). 
The relationship between media and the presidency is an interesting and sometimes 
mutual one. The presidency uses the media to speak to the public while the media 
use the presidency to interpret events or issues. Essentially, the media and the 
presidency feed off each other. This mutual exchange is of significance, because it 
changes how the presidents operate, in that the focus is now on how they attempt to 
govern, previously it was on the amount of power they had (Ceaser et al.,1981). 
Social media, another technological advancement, adds to peoples’ access of a 
president’s speech. According to Rhodes University’s Jude Mathurine, co-ordinator 
of new media at the School of Journalism and Media Studies, there is no data yet 
that indicated definite influence on voter patterns in SA compared to Barack 
Obama’s 2008 presidential campaigning which has been the subject of several 
studies. However, Mathurine noted that South Africans did use social media 
platforms to promote their political beliefs, or canvass for their political affiliations. 
The parties also use social media to communicate messages from their political 
leaders (Nevill, 2014). 
These days, presidents across the globe face the challenging task of having to 
deliver speeches that are powerful enough to provide direction on events as he or 
she relies on rhetoric to govern (Ceaser et al., 1981 & Stuckey, 2010).  
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However, Cohen (1995) argued that the public generally is inattentive to politics. 
Therefore, when the president wants to attract attention to an issue, he has to signal 
that a policy problem is important by speaking about it in fundamental terms.  
Cohen (1995) demonstrated that when a president referred to a policy, people were 
more likely to be either aware or concerned. Thus, it would be in the best interest of 
the president to explain his reasons for adopting a position and provide information 
which supports the importance of the policy area.  
However, in some cases, the presidency does not have to have to make solid 
arguments about a policy problem but can merely mention it and the public will take 
notice of such issues. In the case of the South African government’s reluctant 
position on providing anti-retroviral drugs for persons infected with HIV, a civil society 
group, TAC, used all the tools at its disposal such as protest, petition and litigation to 
successfully challenge government’s controversial HIV and AIDs policy (Ranchod, 
2007). 
Climate change and communication 
The South African government while providing political leadership on climate change 
also holds the responsibility to protect people susceptible to climate change effects 
(Madzwamuse, 2011). But Hulme (2009) argued that climate change threatens both 
national and global security. With that threat, comes the rhetoric associated similar to 
that of international terrorism. This means that there is a new form of geo-diplomacy 




The geo-politics of climate change is a difficult path to navigate. It is estimated that 
30 percent of the world’s poor live in countries where the economy is dominated by a 
resource of wealth.  
Countries that have been in conflict over resources have their challenges 
exacerbated whilst trying to reduce emissions. States or groups of states could use 
climate change to their favour and that arm conflicts could occur as governments 
attempt to access limited resources as demands increase (Giddens, 2009). 
Giddens (2009) also referred to IPCC reports which indicated that resourced-base 
wars could still occur in this century. While changes are expected in mass migration 
in cities in poorer countries, the wealthier ones are not exempt from the effects. For 
example, the US has already experienced extreme weather patterns. 
For a long time, climate change was communicated as a scientific problem, and it’s 
only in the last two decades that it has been placed on the global political and 
economic agenda and this has been no different in SA (Taderera, 2010).  
Communication on climate change and related policies are vital because 
understanding of the subject means that people will be able to prepare for the future 
by taking necessary precautions, especially if they live in areas that are vulnerable to 
climate change. They can also make behavioural changes that can contribute to the 
mitigating climate change. One study found that South Africans do not see climate 
change as having any special relevance to the country or continent (Neville, 2010).  
Another study stated that “the levels of awareness in SA of climate change as a 
global phenomenon are concerning”. An empowered citizen could also hold his or 




However, a critique of the National Climate Change Response White Paper (from 
here on referred to as the White Paper) emphasised the elite nature of some 
aspects. For example, the response envisages a communication plan that adopts a 
strict top-down approach which is both “elitist and vertical” (Srampickal, 2006), 
stating that “government departments will start communicating with citizens about 
climate change to inform and educate them and to influence their behavioural 
choices”.  
The argument here is that the White Paper does little to inspire active participation 
which is significant to affecting behavioural changes needed to help limit carbon 
emissions. The White Paper also fails to acknowledge communication in the 11 
official South African languages. This is important as research indicated that if real 
behaviour change is to happen, then community participation is a must, especially in 
marginalised communities (Smith, 2013). 
Global climate change policy started to receive attention in the 1960s while only a 
little consideration was given to energy policy debates of the 1970s. By the early 
1980s as it became increasingly clear that warming from greenhouse gases, was a 
serious concern. The scientific community then started to try to persuade 
governments to pay attention to the growing environment challenge (Dessler & 
Parson, 2006). In recent times, the SA government has been using rhetoric which 
indicated a move towards cleaner energy, civil society, however, still feels there is 
much focus on fossil fuels (Masters, 2009).  
A report by two leading non-governmental organisations argued that the SA 
government has taken more positive steps on pushing for strong outcomes in the 
international area.  
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However, the report pointed out that the State has not done enough at home to hold 
large industries accountable (Earthlife Africa & Oxfam International, 2009). 
Masters (2009) argued that country’s industrial sector has indicated movement 
towards sustainable development policies; however this has not actually translated 
into reduction of GHG emissions. In fact, a 2013 report by the National Business 
Initiative said, “despite the encouraging disclosure improvement and voluntary 
commitments, company actions are not resulting in significant emissions reductions 
– and there remains great variation in performance between and within sectors” 
(Carbon Disclosure Project, 2013). 
Government’s position on climate change has experienced opposition from the 
business sector. For example, the business and industry sectors have continued to 
express concern for government’s negotiating position on climate change because 
the prospect of a future carbon tax could present additional challenges (Masters, 
2009).  
In 2009, at the South African National Climate Change Summit, the Energy Reality 
Group, were against the idea of the country taking steps to reduce emissions. The 
group made up of scientists, engineers and economists noted in a statement that 
“mitigation costs are high and the threats that climate change pose are too uncertain 
to justify diverting significant resources from development” (Masters, 2009). 
Getting the balance right as far as meeting developing needs and dealing with 
climate change is confusing and SA is not alone in this confusion (Earthlife Africa & 




Therefore, the idea behind this dissertation is not to merely identify the strengths or 
the shortcomings in the President’s speeches but more importantly to understand 
how he communicates the complexities of climate change and identify if any policy is 
reflected in his rhetoric. 
For example, the Zuma administration has relentlessly pushed job creation as a 
priority (Zuma, 2009). In relation to climate change, green jobs are a concept that 
has been mentioned in Zuma’s speeches. The jury, however, is still out on the 
number of green jobs created and exactly what constitutes a green job (Masters, 
2011). Nhamo (2013) stated that for green growth to permeate the continent, Africa 
will need to enhance her political will and manifest shared visions and focus on 
economic development.  
Nhamo (2013) supported the need to better understand the green economy and 
advocates for the role of education and media along with human capital, good 
governance and a good investment climate, operational information technology as 
“parameters not necessarily directly linked to green economy” but that are vital. 
Neville (2010) stated that South Africans get their information on climate change 
through media and schools. There are numerous studies into the media 
representation of climate change that have highlighted common challenges. Due to 
the complexities of the subject, journalists struggle to properly cover climate change 
and also there is a lack of editorial interest (Finlay, 2010). Media coverage on 





There is a tendency for local media to use reports from international news agencies 
in times of environmental disasters and climate change related conferences. While, 
this makes financial sense and keeps the subject on the agenda, this practice 
excluded the African voice, especially at grass root levels (Finlay, 2012 & Tagbo 
2012). Ultimately, the government has a responsibility to keep its citizens informed 
and at the same time ensure that climate change climbs up both national and 
international agendas (Madzwamuse, 2011).  
This dissertation will argue the importance of addressing climate change, the 
president’s rhetoric on the subject because of his visibility and how he discursively 
constructs this issue both in the South African and African context. It will ask and 
seek to answer questions on the post South Africa’s democratic government’s 
political climate change rhetoric. The analysis of Zuma’s speeches can contribute to 
the environmental communication field. 
Zuma’s speeches and those of his two key ministers on climate change dating from 
October 2011 (the build up to) COP17 until December 2011 (when the conference 
ended) will be analysed. The researcher will also consider the president’s speeches 
at COP15 and COP16. The speeches of Minister of COP17, also South Africa’s 
Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane and 
Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs, Edna Molewa, will be analysed to 
establish if there is any cohesion in thought and rhetoric between the ministers and 
president. The researcher will also briefly examine the speeches of former 




During the high level meeting in 2011, Molewa led the South African delegation to 
the COP, to ensure that the country’s interests were properly represented during the 
negotiations. On the other hand, Nkoana-Mashabane was made the COP 17 
President.  Her department, DIRCO, was required to perform logistical duties at the 
COP 17 and play a significant role in facilitating a positive outcome. Nkoana-
Mashabane and her department had to see to it that the conference functioned 
within the requirements of the UNFCCC.  The decision for the two appointments was 
deemed strategic. The South African government had recognised its role in 
managing the international diplomacy of climate change, however, were also 
cognisant of its duty to ensure that South Africa’s interests were protected during the 
negotiations (Parramon-Gurney & Gilde 2012). 
1.2 Thesis statement 
To study political rhetoric is to study political language and the dynamics between 
the speaker and the audience and how the language is used or abused. Students of 
presidential rhetoric must prioritise language, especially in the media politics era 
(Windt, 1986). 
This study is thus pertinent to the rhetorical presidency when it comes to climate 
change as a political and politicised issue. Given the politicisation and complexities 
of climate change, this dissertation on rhetorical studies seeks to go beyond the 
analysis and criticism of presidential speeches and campaigns. Medhurst (1996) 
stated that in the early 1970s that presidential rhetoric emerged as a specialised 





The impact of public language and arguments and how it relates to presidential 
power are subjects that interest scholars in this discipline (Windt, 1986). Meanwhile, 
observations have indicated a rise of the rhetorical presidency, in that the number of 
speeches has been increasing and purpose of presidential rhetoric changing 
(Tienken, 2013). 
The president’s primary task is to provide the people with solutions for public 
problems (Hargrove, 1998). Climate change, described as the most serious 
challenge that cropped up in the past few decades, is one such problem and is 
difficult to manage. Dessler & Parson (2006) argued that knowledge about climate 
change, like all scientific knowledge is subject to uncertainty; however, this should 
not prevent action from being taken immediately. 
There are several reasons presidents deliver speeches, one of the most significant, 
being to communicate policy preferences to legislators. For presidents, speeches are 
a key tool to communicate their positions on current political situations and are also 
used to help them govern their people (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2010). Based on this 
purpose mentioned above, it’s therefore a reasonable argument that the shaping of 
climate change rhetoric within politics is driven largely by presidents and major 
political figures (Vint, 2012).  
High-level politicians contribute to the understanding of climate change by making 
use of different rhetorical frames (Vint, 2012). Therefore, this dissertation analyses 
how Zuma employs different frames that address climate change with the political 
and economic spheres. It also seeks to understand how these frames contribute to 
understanding South Africa’s position on climate change both as a country and a 
leader in Africa. 
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Over the past few years, SA’s role in the international climate change negotiations 
has been one of importance. Pouris & Naidoo (2011) stated that SA has contributed 
scientific input as part of the IPCC and has also been a leading voice in forming a 
global binding deal to address the challenges, resulting from climate change. SA 
finds itself in more than one coalition. The development of coalitions has become a 
critical part in the structure of multilateral negotiations. The reason is that countries 
belonging to coalitions are in a position to wield more bargaining power than if they 
had to act as an entity (Auer & Racine, 2001).  
African countries negotiate through the Group of 77 + China and through the Africa 
Group. There are also other powerful coalitions such as BASIC, LDC, Alliance of 
Small Island States, and Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (Manika, 
2013). Thus, SA has both represented interests of other Africa countries as well as 
other developing states, depending in which group it negotiated in (Parramon-
Gurney & Gilde 2012).  
SA alongside their BRICS partners has become a force during negotiations. These 
countries’ increasing global emissions are also a factor in negotiations. African 
countries’ needs and vulnerabilities differ vastly from that of the developing BRICS 
and make it difficult for them to negotiate at COPs. Also the size of the delegations 
and the resources of the different nations impact the extent to which participation is 
possible. It is suggested that the developed world focuses on emerging developing 




However, the country’s innovative and pro-active efforts to deal with climate change 
have been commended. With the introduction of its White Paper, SA has also 
positioned itself as a leading force for developing countries (Parramon-Gurney & 
Gilde 2012). 
The White Paper sets outs the country’s proposed response to climate change with 
two key objectives. The first aim is to address climate change impacts by employing 
sustainable measures in relation to the country’s social, economic and environmental 
resilience and emergency response capacity. The second aim is about stabilising 
SA’s contribution to the global GHG emissions in the atmosphere, bearing in mind; 
it’s commitments to its development goals (The Government of the Republic of South 
Africa, 2011). 
These aims will be addressed by strategies within a short, medium and long term 
time frame. The second aim, in accordance with the UNFCCC, articulates that the 
ultimate objective of the Convention is to “stabilisation of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system”. (UNFCCC, n.d). 
The White Paper is said to contain elements that are “developmental; 
transformational, empowering and participatory; dynamic and evidence-based; 
balanced and cost effective; and integrated and aligned” (The Government of the 
Republic of South Africa, 2011). However, SA has been criticised by some African 
countries, particularly the LDC and the Small Island States in Africa, not paying heed 
to their best interests but rather aligning itself more to developed countries 




Further to the White Paper, the South African government in its first year in the new 
dispensation signed the UNFCCC and ratified it four years later (Neville, 2010). 
Government subsequently introduced or amended different pieces of legislation, 
around energy and the environment. Chagutah (2009) stated that according to 
University of Cape Town Associate Professor at the Energy Research Centre, 
Harald Winkler, climate change was a priority for the ANC and other political parties 
in 2009, which happen to be an election year. This, according to Winkler, was the 
first time that the global challenge was considered an election issue (Chagutah, 
2009). 
Zuma came in to power in 2009, a year that was touted as a crucial one for climate 
change, as the decisive Copenhagen talks or COP15 loomed. Following his 
inauguration, Zuma, spilt departments each, with their own ministers. Related more 
to the environment and energy, the Zuma has created two new departments by 
separating the Department of Minerals and Energy into the Departments of Mining 
and the Department of Energy. So was the case of the Department of Water affairs 
and Forestry (Chagutah, 2009). At the time the decision of the spilt was attributed to 
the president wanting to address “developmental challenges that need to receive 
immediate attention” and “achieve visible and tangible socio-economic development 
within five years” (Zuma, 2009). 
When Zuma addressed delegates at the COP15, he said developed countries are 
“historically responsible for around 80 percent of the current emissions in the 
atmosphere”. At the Copenhagen talks described as the “largest summit in the 
history of international diplomacy”, Zuma also highlighted the position of developing 
countries, which he said are “most affected by climate change and are least capable 
to adapt to the impacts”.  
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Zuma said “agreements that recognise the common responsibility of all nations to 
reduce emissions, while not retarding the development the developing countries” are 
imperative (Zuma, 2009).  
Zuma added that while developing countries would do their bit to reduce global 
emissions, it is up to the wealthier nations to lead the fight. SA is not alone in 
adopting this position, as the North-South side dynamic will be explored further on. 
Already some of the developing nations are at a disadvantage when having to deal 
with climate change because its limited resources as compared to the developed 
countries that have access to financial and technological resources to address 
climate change (Gupta, 2000). 
While, Zuma did not talk about the security threats that climate change could spur 
on, other African leaders at different occasions brought this issue to the fore. The 
North-South side dynamic is an important one because of the way climate change is 
viewed by countries belonging to this divide. When it comes to climate change 
negotiations the South sees climate change as a development issue while the North 
views climate change as an environmental issue (Manika, 2013). 
Common but differentiated responsibilities – has become the other important 
consideration is the South’s arguments. This speaks to Article 3 of the Convention 
which advocates “that taking into account that policies and measures to deal with 
climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest 




There is agreement from the developed nations that there should be common 
responsibilities to address climate change. However, developing nations place 
emphasis on differentiated responsibilities in climate change policy (Kasa et al., 
2008). 
One of the main reasons that make addressing climate change incredibly 
challenging is that global economies depend on burning fossil fuel energy. The 
challenge is also that these countries do not favour simple technological avenues to 
correct the problem. There are no quick of cheap alternative forms of energy sources 
available to cater of almost 80 percent of the world’s energy needs which is currently 
being serviced by fossil fuels (Dessler & Parson, 2006). 
During the COP17 in 2011, SA persisted with its call for a “legally binding instrument 
for measurable, reportable, and verifiable finance, technology and capacity support 
from developed to developing countries” (Masters, 2011). During his speeches, 
Zuma emphasised the debate on contribution to climate change made by the 
developed and developing worlds and the question of funding for mitigation and 
adaptation endeavours by the latter. 
The South has been adamant that it’s developmental needs cannot be compromised 
when solution are being sought out in in the global efforts to address climate change, 
an important point because institutions such as the World Bank and the United 
Nations Development Program are working to halt and even reverse poverty. 
Climate change is an issue that cannot solely be addressed at country levels. Even if 
one country decreases emissions significantly, it still remains irrelevant if other 
countries continue emitting high levels of GHGs (Manika, 2013). 
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Climate change effects that go unchecked, in addition to costs for implementing 
climate policy are issues which have become a reality for most nations. Each 
country’s emissions are closely related to their economic activities and thus 
geopolitical future. This means that climate change policy is and will not be just 
about the environment but more to do with economic policy and it is power politics 
(Wiener, 2008).  
SA, considered to be a "laboratory for democracy" in an era of global politics, is a 
good example to provide a "test case for the relevance of rhetorical studies in a 
postmodern democracy" (Salazaar, 2002). 
1.3 Significance of the topic 
Understanding how the South African government (here represented by Zuma and 
his Ministers of International Relations and Environmental Affairs) communicate 
climate change is important to establish its position on the domestic, continental and 
international fronts. The need to understand how the SA government communicates 
climate change is further compounded by the fact that the country, while itself 
affected by climate change, also seeks a balance between managing its greenhouse 
gas emissions and meeting its developmental goals and expanding economy.  
SA’s history of racial oppression has resulted in a severely unequal country. Coupled 
with poverty and unemployment, South Africa like other nations, seeks to address 
these social developmental goals by improving the global standard of living. For 
many countries success in these goals meant that there was growth in the national 
domestic gross product and in personal income (Hulme, 2009). 
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Peterson (2004) argued that the president’s voice is the “most visible and important 
signifier of political thought around climate change”. The president also plays a 
significant role in agenda setting when it comes to important issues. 
There is a lack of scholarship on how the president communicates climate change 
within the communication field. How the president communicates climate change has 
an impact on the way environmental concerns are articulated. In Africa, the few 
studies that examine presidential rhetoric mainly relate to single speeches, such as 
inaugural addresses. There is little literature on both environmental and presidential 
rhetoric because these two areas are studied independently (Vint, 2012). 
Despite, SA’s best efforts thus far, the country also finds itself in a precarious 
situation in that it suffers the effects of climate change but at the same time is a 
leading contributor to the problem. Cloete, Ramgowlan & Taylor (2011) noted that 
SA’s CO2 emissions are higher than those of European countries, largely due to the 
dependence on fossil fuels for energy production. The country has been able to 
attract international investment because of its cheap energy. SA’s dependence on 
fossil fuels continues because of its development needs. This raises the question if 
SA can actually meet international climate change mitigation goals (Masters, 2011). 
The detrimental nature of climate change is indicated by the severe harm it can 
cause and the costs and difficulties associated with reducing the changes. Policy 
issues with higher stakes generally translate into more litigious debates. The risks of 
climate change and dependence of fossil fuels to the world economy mean that 
vigorous opposing views are expected over what needs to do be done over climate 




1.4 Research Objective 
This dissertation provides a rhetorical criticism analysing how high-level politicians in 
SA, especially Zuma and two of his ministers position the State and Africa in intense 
climate change discussions both at home and abroad.  
The study also seeks to examine government’s (Zuma and his two ministers 
mentioned above) own rhetorical understanding of climate change. Another goal of 
this analysis is to ascertain, by identifying frames, if the government communicates 
how action must be taken, who must take the action and to what end. 
Therefore, the proposed study recognises the potential of adding knowledge in the 
area of communicating climate change by understanding how government 
communicates. The analysis of Zuma’s speeches aims to also provide insight to two 
important questions. Firstly, how does SA prioritise climate change alongside 
daunting its national priorities which include job creation and the eradication of, 
poverty and social inequality? Secondly, what is SA’s position on climate change in 
relation to the continent given that it is the largest contributor to GHG emissions and 






1.5 Brief summaries of sub-themes 
Climate change and Africa 
The African continent’s climate change challenges have received global attention. 
But Makina (2013) argued that the continent remains the face of a helpless victim. 
Nobel Peace Prize winner, the late Wangari Maathai, in her book The Challenge for 
Africa, discussed how for centuries “the world has been telling Africa who they are”. 
Makina (2013) also suggested that Africa’s position more as a recipient and victim as 
opposed to a participant stand to impact negatively on it future generations. 
Africa, despite their numerous and unique challenges, often fall under one group and 
that is the developing countries. As previously highlighted the discourse on climate 
change between the developed and developing countries is that the former is 
responsible for most of the GHG emissions while the later are left to suffer the 
consequences. African politicians have used powerful rhetoric when talking about 
the impact on climate change on the continent. In 2007 at an African Union Summit, 
Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni called climate change an “act of aggression” by 
the developed world against the developing world and demanding compensation for 
the damage (Brown, Hammill & Mcleman, 2007). Namibia’s representative to the 
UN, Kaire Mbuende, called the developed countries’ emissions of greenhouses “low 
intensity biological or chemical warfare” (Njeru, 2008).  
On face value these views may seem harsh but the reality is that climate change 
negotiations continue to be drive countries’ economic growth trajectories rather than 
the environment. The planet is being reshaped by climate politics and this is evident 
during climate change talks where negotiations have been about how the global 




A number of challenges experienced by African countries in negotiations have been 
qualified in studies (Makina, 2013; Mumma, 2013 & Gupta, 2000).The G77 + China 
contains the majority of poor countries. Many of these countries have at some point 
experienced civil war.  
A large number of countries make up the G77 + China. The diversity of these 
countries and different governance systems result in them expressing interests that 
are both similar and different. Many of these countries are challenged by a lack of 
resources. Their diversity, individual challenges at a country level and varying levels 
of vulnerability make it difficult to agree on a common position on climate change. It 
is imperative that policies that support solutions are appropriate for the specific 
needs of those countries in this group (Gupta, 2000 & Makina, 2013).  
Additionally, G77 + China countries find themselves with ideological challenges in 
climate change negotiations. For example, some of the nations face extreme poverty 
and inequality, which leaves them in difficult positions when they have decided on 
whether to focus on growth in the short term or use their last resources in a way that 
will not be able to sustain them (Gupta, 2000). It is unlikely that these problems will 
not become simpler anytime soon, with the latest IPCC report providing evidence 
that the continent is getting warmer and that already affected ecosystems will be 
subjected to further considerable changes.  
Water availability is expected to come under more stress because of changes to the 
climate. African national governments are addressing climate change and are 




However, the report stated that an effective co-ordination of the various adaptation 
initiatives implemented are lacking. For Africa to address risks posed by climate 
change and execute meaningful adaptation strategies, it would require substantial 
support in resources such as finance, technology and institutional and capacity 
development (IPCC, 2013).  
Climate change and women & children 
Women 
Studies from the 1980’s indicate that women, especially those in rural areas in 
developing countries, interact more with the environment and experience the impacts 
of environmental degradation more as compared to men (Dankelman, 2010). A study 
in rural KwaZulu-Natal more recently, indicated that due to socially constructed roles 
and responsibility, climate change exacerbated the already heavy work load of the 
women in this area (Babugura, 2010). 
Women in rural or poor parts of the world are often tasked with activities that are 
dependent on resources which are affected by climate changes. Women need 
access to water, vegetation and wood (Adger et al., 2007).  Women had to work 
physically harder but were also emotionally exhausted from worrying about how they 
and their families would survive. For example, women still have to walk long 
distances to collect water (Babugura, 2010). 
Women experience climate change differently due to a number of inequalities 
already prevalent. The factors include women’s position in society, access to 
resources and their power relations they encounter in solving climate change 
challenges (Babugura, 2010).   
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It is therefore concerning that women are excluded from decision making processes 
for the usage and management of natural resources, energy policies and 
programmes, which lie with male-dominated organisations (Dankelman, 2010; 
UNECA, 2009). 
Despite these challenges, the role women play in protecting the environment does 
not go unnoticed (Dankelman, 2010). Women are not merely victims in the process 
and gender issues must be factored into climate change responses. Activists 
advocate that attention must be paid to “gender differentiated perspectives” around 
climate change and that women’s input must be included in national policies, action 
plans and sustainable development proposals (Babugura, 2010). 
Children 
In a UNICEF report, the United Nations affiliated organisation acknowledged the 
South African government’s effort to address climate change. The organisation 
recognised the proposals in the White Paper but observed that children’s needs and 
plans to address it were lacking (UNICEF, 2011).  
Children in rural areas in South Africa are disadvantaged. Just in three of the nine 
provinces in SA - KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and the Eastern Cape – at least 76% of 
children are live in rural areas. These children are subjects to poverty, inequality and 
the consequences of climate change. They lack proper housing, primary health care, 
access to clean water and proper sanitation. These factors impact on their physical 
and mental development. However, attention too must be paid to children in urban 
areas. They too are subjected to different developmental challenges which include 
over populated urban areas and urban planning. The issue of inadequate 
infrastructure in urban areas also impact on children (UNICEF, 2011). 
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The report described children as invisible persons. The argument is that with any 
level of government children’s needs are not recognised nor is there 
acknowledgement for their role as change agents, particularly at grassroots levels. 
One of the recommendations was that focus on children becomes an important part 
in laws and policies, especially in the time of disasters, where children face the risk 
of neglect or abuse (UNICEF, 2011). 
Climate change and poverty 
The implications of climate change on poverty reduction are serious enough to 
threaten years of development efforts. In fact, the latest IPCC report supports this 
with its latest finding that climate change is expected to create a new poor between 
now and 2100 with further negative impacts on sustainable development. There are 
expectations that some regions including urban areas and some rural regions in sub-
Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia to suffer further impacts of climate change 
(Niang & Ruppel, 2013). 
A report, compiled by a host of international organisations including developing 
banks, the World Bank and at least two UN programmes, stated that climate change 
will exacerbate current vulnerabilities faced by poor communities, even though the 
impacts may vary. The report highlight the common challenges as a result of climate 
change but also warn that for some families in affected areas, migration could be 




The emphasis on adaptation comes on the basis that “the higher the concentrations 
of GHGs, the higher the likelihood of irreversible and grave damage to human and 
biological systems” (Abeygunawardena et al., 2003). 
 
1.5 Brief summaries of the chapters 
Chapter one will introduce the dissertation topic, followed by the background and 
dissertation statement. It will also contain a short explanation of the significance of 
the topic and the research objectives. There are also sub-themes identified that 
relate to climate change.  Chapter two will consist of the theoretical framework that 
will be employed in this dissertation. Chapter three reviews the literature that relate 
to climate change and the presidential rhetoric separately. Chapter four will focus on 
the methodology used in the dissertation while chapter five will present the findings. 
Chapter six will provide a brief discussion and include the limitations of the study. 











Chapter Two: Theoretical framework 
The Moral Foundation Theory (MTF), Steve Vanderheiden’s political theory that 
addresses climate change justice in terms of justice, equality and responsibility 
together with framing theory will provide the theoretical framework for this 
dissertation. 
2.1 Moral Foundation Theory 
Presidential rhetoric is concerned with how a president can use different rhetorical 
strategies to persuade the public. Windt (1986) argued that a President has few 
powers available to him or her but in a democracy, presidential rhetoric may well be 
the “fundamental power upon which all others rest”. South Africa has a constitutional 
democracy. There is a proportional representation voting system based on political 
party lists at the national and provincial levels. In short, the leader of the party with 
majority votes becomes the President of the country, in this case Zuma, the leader of 
the ANC, is thus the President of the country (SA info, 2014).  
As such, the president of a democratic nation will rely on effective rhetoric that 
persuades to bridge differently situated actors (Dryzek, 2010). People would need 
substantial knowledge to understand the complicated nature of politics, therefore the 
role that political rhetoric play  in shaping different viewpoints is a crucial one (Saleh, 
2014). 
Climate change presents a morally ambiguous problem as far as developing global 






While it has been established that an effective international response to climate 
change is needed, governments also have to pay attention to their own national 
economic systems and political processes, hence complicating climate change 
negotiations (Dawson & Tyson, 2012). 
People’s attitudes towards politicised issues (such as abortion, homosexuality and 
xenophobia and climate change) are influenced by moral considerations (Dawson 
&Tyson, Mucciaroni, 2011; Kovela et al., 2012). However, there are not many 
studies that provide an understanding of how moral rhetoric is used strategically, 
especially by political elites, to appeal to the public’s morals. Building on MFT, this 
dissertation will also seek to understand if Zuma uses moral rhetoric in relation to 
climate change. 
According to MFT, five innate psychological systems facilitate the constructions of 
moral virtues, meanings and institutions among human groups but to a varying 
degree. These systems create quick gut-reactions either of like or dislike to different 
situations.  These reactions are what lead to people making judgments of right and 
wrong (Kovela et al., 2012). 
The five foundations of MFT refers to how people react “emotionally to harm, 
reciprocity (including justice, fairness, and rights), ingroup, hierarchy, and purity”, 
according to Graham et al (2009). Initially, MFT was developed for cultural 





However, scholars’ thinking of the link between morality and how political attitudes 
have been formed has been influenced by MFT (Weber & Federico, 2013; Graham 
et al., 2009).  Scholars in the US used MTF to understand differences in the political 
systems. When making moral judgements, the conservatives identified with all five 
foundations almost equally as compared to the liberals who resonated with mainly 
the harm and fairness foundations (Graham et al., 2009; McAdams & et al, 2008; 
Haidt & Graham 2007). 
South Africa’s political system does not divide people into liberals and conservatives, 
therefore an understanding of how people employ the five foundations to sensitive 
issues might not be clear. However, morality as an issue was a serious enough 
concern for South Africa’s new democratic government. The state introduced the 
Moral Regeneration Movement, an initiative close to former President Nelson 
Mandela’s heart. Government also held a Moral summit in 1998 with a strong 
emphasis on the relation between morality and crime (Rauch, 2005). 
In 2010, Zuma commented that “South Africans inherently have high moral values 
and standards” while calling for moral renewal. He said “moral communities are 
important to sustain and consolidate democracy, peace and prosperity in South 
Africa.” 
Politicians can use MFT to garner support for their various policies (Koleva et al., 
2012). The link between morality and attitude formation means that “moral appeals 




Moral rhetoric is language that one uses when one wants to take a moral position on 
an issue (Sagi & Dehghani, 2013). The persuasiveness nature of moral language 
makes it most likely to be used during pivotal moments such as presidential 
speeches or passing of a bill (Skitka, Bauman & Sargis, 2005). There is a tendency 
for people’s worldview to be affected when moral rhetoric is used in political debates 
and discourse which can result in higher levels of political intensity (Clifford, & Jerit, 
2013; Koleva, et al, 2012). 
Clifford & Jerit (2013) showed that moral rhetoric increases to counter an opposing 
side’s use of moral language. For example, with stem cell research a politically 
sensitive subject, elites on opposing sides used moral words in an effort to influence 
the public.  Kovela et al. (2012) noted that moral foundation can predict a person’s 
opinion on controversial political issues more than political ideology. Therefore, it 
would be strategically beneficial for politicians to use moral rhetoric in their public 
arguments (Chong & Druckman 2007). 
By understanding what moral language political elites use; when they use this 
rhetoric in policy debates and the effect is has on the public, one can get greater 
insight on how politicians attempt to use moral reasoning for support. The first two 
questions are relevant in this dissertation because South Africa has been playing a 
prominent role in climate change negotiations.  
Also, its status in developing nations in coalitions draws criticism from other African 




It has been observed that words may do “the work of politics” (Graham & et al., 
2009). However, while studying the choice of words, the researcher aims to 
understand how Zuma places emphasis on certain features to make his strongest 
arguments. This dissertation uses an original qualitative content analysis on the 
debate over climate change. 
2.2 Climate change justice 
Vanderheiden (2008) stated that anthropogenic climate change is an issue of justice 
and fairness in global politics. A collective effort guided by a moral imperative is 
needed to limit the total GHGs emitted. Essentially, for human life to be sustained, 
the right to distribute GHGs must be fair (Caney, 2009).  
Science and economics have been central to climate change debates without giving 
nearly as much attention to the issue of justice. While governments have been 
drawing attention to the “other priorities”, a significant part of its population has failed 
to see the magnitude of environmental issues. 
 “Equity is basic to the justice process” and mitigation policies to redistribute climate 
change requires the justice component. However, concepts such as justice which is 
related to concepts such as equality, distribution, desert and responsibility, are 
complex ones and more especially in the case of climate change (Vanderheiden, 
2008). The nature of this scientific phenomenon is complex largely because of its 
long-terms effects that occurs globally, spatially and temporally.  
This dissertation concerns itself with climate change justice because of South 




South Africa has been leading the charge on efforts to address climate change but 
places much emphasis on differentiated responsibility, given Africa’s developmental 
needs at present. 
Mitigating emissions is imperative and a matter of urgency. But it is argued that 
mitigation responsibilities – emissions reduction of GHGs, carbon sinks need to be 
created and maintained, and increasing alternative energy sources and also creating  
technology – along with adaptation measures are not sufficient to deal with climate 
change. It is proposed that compensation responsibilities must also be considered. 
The third responsibility should be to help people whose rights have been violated 
because of the impacts of climate change (Caney, 2009 & Shukla, 1999). 
The utopian view is that climate justice requires global solidarity to effectively deal 
with climate change. And that cohesive approach to climate change will mean that all 
people in all countries are equal with equal voices, which will translate into an urgent 
collective responsibility and moral duty (Robinson, 2013). But this has not been the 
case for a few reasons. 
The problems posed by climate change are intergenerational largely because the 
sources and impacts occur over space, time and species. However, it is important for 
justice to be administered to address both intragenerational and intergenerational 
inequalities. 
The emissions remain in the atmosphere for centuries. Governments of 
industrialised nations committed voluntarily to stabilise their emissions. However, the 
converse has occurred, when emissions continue to rise, despite the scientific 
evidence indicating the urgency to reduce emissions.  
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Political inertia has been and remains a challenge to climate change as governments 
drag their feet using delaying and obstruction tactics. Climate change negotiations 
are an indication of just how difficult it has been to reach agreements on fairness and 
equality in not only taking responsibility but future consensus on GHG emissions. As 
was the case with the Copenhagen talks which was dubbed a “geopolitical disaster” 
(Gardiner, 2006). The division of emission rights is distributed among the developed 
and developing worlds, hence this becomes a question of global justice which 
Shukla (1999) argued is the primary justice issue in climate negotiations currently. 
There are three important inequities in the political arena that still plague the globe 
starting with the relative casual responsibility of nations. Some nations have 
contributed more to GHG emissions due to their industrialised nature but getting 
these nations to take responsibility for it has been politically challenging. More 
affluent nations that depend on carbon intensive activities and have high 
consumption levels stand to make the poor even more poor as the latter will have to 
bear the economic costs of climate change (Vanderheiden, 2008). 
Secondly, those nations that bear the relative casual responsibility for anthropogenic 
climate change are more likely to have resources to reduce GHG emissions on a 
larger scale. And finally, the developing nations are expected to suffer the predicted 
harmful effects of climate change without having the economic capabilities for 
mitigating endeavours.  
To this end, these inequities mean that the designing and implementation of 
solutions to climate change is a complicated process because achieving fairness and 
effectiveness is that more challenging (Vanderheiden, 2008). 
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However, Robinson (2013) argued that for a long time the challenges associated 
with the principles of equity and CBDR and respective capabilities have been used 
as a reason for inaction or to avoid taking responsibility.  
One point of contestation in developing climate change policy has been the question 
of responsibility and in a way a question of fairness. There is a rift between the 
industrialised nations in the North and the developing nations in the South. In the 
climate change negotiating spectrum the North has been the driving force in climate 
policy development while the South have been reduced to the role of ratifying 
policies (Vanderheiden, 2008).  
Despite the unfairness in the North-South dynamic the IPCC recognised that 
developing countries too will have play a significant role to meet the main objective 
of the UNFCCC which is the stabilisation of GHG concentrations (Shukla, 1999). 
Vanderheiden (2008) argued that democratic norms are not normally adhered to in 
international negotiations and in this case of climate change.  Also there is little 
political equality when the G8 countries dominate climate change negotiations at the 
expense of the remaining issues, many of whom suffer or are likely to suffer the 
adverse effects of climate change.  
Shukla (1999) agreed with this view, stating that developed nations enjoy greater 
power and are in a position to influence bargaining rules. This can be attributed to 
industrialised nations having access to global capital, military power and knowledge 
resources. For developing nations this imbalance of power is an issue of justice.  
With the shift in the world economy, China has overtaken the world's leading emitter 
the US (Olivier et al., 2013, Weber et al., 2008). 
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Both China and the US, now contribute to 40% of the world's emissions. However, 
neither of these countries have committed to binding limitations on emissions. One of 
reasons is that these countries feel that it would cost them more than they are to 
benefit from limiting their emissions.  
These large volumes of emissions have the potential to cause losses to Europe and 
other developing states such as India and those in Africa (Posner & Sunstein, 2008). 
On this basis, some argued that developing nations can no longer be excluded from 
binding commitments because this leads to another set of inequities (Weber et al., 
2008).  
In the developing world, there is more pressure placed on China compared to South 
Africa or India to lower emissions, but China argues that its must be exempt from 
emissions caps because of its developmental goals, its investment in renewable 
energy and low per capita emissions (Weber et al., 2008). To this end, there is no 
straightforward path to achieving climate change justice. 
Vanderheiden (2008) examined the liberal egalitarian understandings of distributive 
justice. He noted that equity-based and responsibility-based models of fairness both 
part of the UNFCCC is important if a global climate change policy is to be fair and 
just. He also conceded that the language used in international treaties relating to 
climate change contains elements of justice. 
Distributive justice concerns itself with fairness in the distribution of not only the 
burden but the benefits too. What is considered a fair distribution is relative; however 
this theory has been widely associated with climate change (Mowat, 2012).  
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There is consensus among international lawyers that both distributive and corrective 
justice ideas best relate to the CBDR principle, whereby industrialised nations who 
historically have made significant contributions to GHGs should “contribute 
disproportionately to the creation of international public goods” Posner & Sunstein 
(2008). 
Article 3 of the Convention (UNFCCC) stipulates that all countries are obliged to 
protect the climate system for people that are living on the planet now and for all 
those to come. This obligation must occur on the basis of equity and in accordance 
with their CBDR and respective capabilities. Vanderheiden (2008) stated that 
international justice is defined in terms of “equity”, “CBDR” and respective 
capabilities and relates equity to distributive justice. “Responsibilities” and 
“capabilities” are an indication of past GHG emissions and the abilities of nation to 
reduce present level of emissions. Equity is thus a criterion for assigning remedial 
responsibility among nations for climate change, according to (Vanderheiden, 2008). 
On the another hand, Mowat (2012) argued that the formation of new global climate 
change regime has been impeded because of the CBDR principle and that “equal 
responsibility” between countries is in fact not an egalitarian approach. It is also 
argued that while climate change is an issue of science, science cannot dictate how 
they share the atmosphere. There is no “clear and precise rules of international 
positive law” and the global community is subjected to the UNFCCC which commits 
to stop global warming “on the basis of equity”. 
In relation to the principle of CBDR, Mowat (2012) stated that developed nations 
“fatally” challenged this principle during COP17. The industrialised nations felt that 
their developing nation counterparts were emitting as much GHG as they do.  
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Hannah Mowat, an environment advisor raised valid questions which, if anything, 
demonstrated the intricacies at climate change negotiations. Her thinking places 
more emphasis on creating equal situations for countries and as such questioned 
why there is still a need for CBDR to reduce GHGs emissions. Mowat argued that if 
thus far CBDR has prevented a binding legal agreement why is there still so much 
focus on the contentious principle and why has it not yet been “gutted” (Mowat, 
2012).  
Parties to the UNFCCC, such as the US, advocate for fair distribution but on a 
utilitarian or libertarian basis. “Redistribution” to them is unfair as it goes against the 
natural order. The argument is that those able to use distribution in their favour 
should be entitled to a higher distributive portion with higher overall value. A position 
strongly opposed by developing nations because they need equal opportunities to 
grow. They therefore stand their ground that distribution must be based on historical 
emissions and a per capita allocation if justice is to be served.  
2.3 Framing theory 
Framing theory refers to selecting some aspects of an event or issue to get people to 
develop a particular understanding, therefore re-aligning their thinking about an 
issue. Communication frames are relative to a specific issues, events or political 
actors. (Myers et al., 2012; Jong & Druckman, 2007; Entman, 2010 & Nelson, 




The basis of framing theory is that there are multiple perspectives to any issue and 
that important consequences emerge as a result of the framing of issues (Gamson & 
Modigliani 1989). The choice of language in policies influences the debates of the 
respective policy issue. In the case of foreign policies, which are complex and 
ambiguous, framing plays a vital role.  
Framing is a tool often utilised by presidents when they want support for their 
policies. Strategic issue framing thus plays an important role in presidential 
speeches (Garrison, 2001). Issue framing is a pivotal tool, available to presidents to 
define their ideas. In doing so, presidents can avoid the risk of allowing the 
opposition to supply its own definition of their causes (Medhurst, 2006). 
Elite framing requires presidents or leaders to both shape the understanding of the 
public on complex issues  and also offer alternative solutions and as such framing in 
this context can also been seen as a rhetorical tool for elites (Chong & Druckman, 
2007). Framing is necessary especially in cases where the events or issues are 
complex and the various elements demand the public’s attention. Framing is not only 
an essential component of communication but a normal part that allows people to 
negotiate the huge volume of information accessed on a daily basis.  
Therefore, framing can both define problems and also allow for suggestions to 
combat them. Kuypers et al. (2008) noted that the “rhetorical power of a frame 
comes from its function to heighten the saliency of some aspects of reality over 
others.”  It is difficult to avoid framing in policy and public issues, therefore framing 




While framing and media seem to go hand in hand, anyone wanting to emphasise 
specific viewpoints can use this tool (Parton & Morrisonel, 2011). With framing being 
unavoidable, the questions then remain, which frames are activated and who are 
activating them. In the same breath, systems of frames typify political ideologies. 
Framing, therefore, becomes important to successful political communication due to 
its nature to underscore desired views over the rest (Lakoff, 2010). 
Framing in politics 
Entman (2010) stated that understanding framing, in the case of politics, will enable 
one to tell the difference between governments’ preferred versions of issues and 
what actually gets reported on. People use frames as well as their own experiences 
and communication with each other to understand political issues (Nisbet & 
Scheufele, 2009). 
There is a careful consideration in selecting words and images when making up a 
frame that is used to oppose or support a view in political conflicts. Messages are 
crafted using “emotionally charged, understandable and memorable” words or 
images. For example, the US government after the 9/11 attacks repeatedly used 
terms such as “axis of evil and war against terrorism” as part of the framing strategy 
to “unite” the country behind its plan to wage war in Afghanistan (Entman, 2010).  
It has been noted that presidents use framing in strategic ways to pursue longevity in 
their terms at office. Whether presidents are concerned with re-election or leaving a 
legacy, much consideration is given to framing. This is largely because their images 
are quite visible and there are constraints on their framing choices. These 
constraints allows for the prediction of frames used by presidents for the two 
priorities of re-election or legacy.  
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Generally, presidents select frames that have a positive tone and that mainly focus 
on aspects of an issue that are most favourable to him or her. In terms of issues 
around policy, presidents are likely to reinforce the same messages over a period of 
time, using favourable frames, to garner support for his or her policy choices or goals 
(Glazier & Boydstun, 2010). 
In order for frames to be effective or influential, despite who is using them, it needs 
to resonate with the audience’s existing ideas, beliefs or perceptions (Nisbet & 
Scheufele 2009). Lakoff (2010) argued the possibility for changing frames is limited. 
For frames to be effective the right language must be used and introducing new 
language to existing frames is not always possible. Communication systems will 
need to be adjusted to allow for new frames to reach all parts of the population. The 
new frames must also be able to be trusted and for that to happen there must be 
continuous repetition. If these new frames do not make sense they will be ignored. 
Therein lays the importance of frames. When something as complex as climate 
change is being communicated, people must already have “systems of frame” that 
can help them make sense. 
Framing and climate change 
Nisbet & Scheufele (2009) provided an example of how framing of climate change 
reached a different audience. American biologist Edward Wilson and other scientists 
placed emphasis on the religious and moral aspects related to climate change to 
convince religious leaders of the importance of the global challenge. Civic 
organisations with an interest in climate change can participate in “bottom-up” 




These frames that are born here are important because they provide weight to 
stakeholder-sponsored frames which is needed in regulatory and political decisions 
in science (Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009). 
There are advantages to using framing beyond “selling the public on science”. When 
framing is included in communication strategies, there is potential for the promotion 
of dialogue, learning and also provision for understanding points of agreement or 
dissent about an issue (Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009). 
Recently climate change has been framed as a political issue, prior to that it has 
been communicated as an environmental problem (Myers et al., 2012). Global 
warming for example was a difficult concept to grasp because people did not 
possess a system of frames and these frames require time in order for these frame 
systems to be built. The importance of language and visual imaginary (tools used to 
communicate frames) cannot be emphasised enough. Merely using slogans and a 
few keys words also doesn’t guarantee that people understand frames around the 
environment (Lakoff, 2010). 
It is further argued that while practical steps can be taken to improve the 
environment (recycling, growing vegetables, using less energy and so forth) what is 
actually missing is political action. The action needed to deal effectively with the 
changes to climate should come from government because individual actions alone 
cannot mitigate the consequences. Therefore, people should be thinking about their 
government’s contribution in the political turf at home and the international arena. 
However, politics is not in the environment frame (Lakoff, 2010).  
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It is important that policies are formed to address keys elements of an issue and not 
because of frames that are known to resonate with the public (Jong & Druckman, 
2007). 
It was important that this dissertation use framing theory, because understanding 
how climate change is framed is crucial to the way it’s received by the policy makers 
and the public. Framing could provide a lens to see the multi-facets of climate 
change and the extent to which they drive policy. 
In one study, communication researchers and practitioners tested the hypothesis 
that by framing climate change on a personal level, people who were not interested 
or dismissed information on climate change may show interest. The researchers 
used the public health and/or national security as a way to make climate change 
more tangible to people. When the health frame was used, evidence suggested that 
people reacted on emotional level in support of climate change mitigation and 
adaptation measures. People’s emotional reactions to climate change can inform 
communicators about the strengths and weaknesses in the communication 
strategies. But this factor is often overlooked (Myers & et al, 2012). 
Different stakeholders in climate change have to compete with each other to make 
their case in salient issues, which results in frames serving ideological and 
governance purposes (Nisbett, 2009). One of the keys to success in any democracy 
is mobilising support within the majority of its people; therefore governments need to 




Issue framing is central to political persuasion campaigns (Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, 
2009). In the US, climate change frames oscillated between “unfair economic 
burden” courtesy of Republican pollster Frank Luntz to Al Gore’s “climate crises”. 
Another key frame focused on public accountability.  
Scientists and democrats were said to use the public accountability frame against 
George W. Bush administration. This frame, called the “war on science” was 
cemented when The Republican War on Science (2005) was published. President 
Barack Obama’s framing of climate change came in the form of the public 
accountability frame when he promised “to restore science to its rightful place” 
(Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009). 
According to Nordhaus & Schellenberger (2007) the “unfair economic burden” frame 
was turned into the “economic development” frame, with major emphasis on 
“creating green jobs” used by the Obama administration and recently in South Africa 
(The Government of SA, 2011). 
When using the framing theory to identify the master narrative in Zuma’s speeches, 
consideration will also be given if frames are of a general and specific nature. Jacoby 
( 2000) clearly demonstrated the difference between a general and specific frame. In 
a general issue, attention is paid to the disputed governmental activity itself rather 
than its causes or consequences. An example of a general issue frame is a 






Meanwhile, a specific issue frame explicitly links governmental activities with targets 
in society. Statements of this type not only promote certain policy initiatives; they 
also identify the reasons that such steps are necessary, along with the beneficiaries 
(or victims) of governmental action. An example of a specific issue frame might be 
"The federal government should protect the environment, in order to reduce air/water 
pollution and to protect people whose lives and property are threatened by toxic 
waste dumps" (Jacoby, 2000).  
The understanding and arguments made in the three sections under the theoretical 
framework chapter, allows the researcher to then examine the speeches to 
understand how South Africa positions itself on the global scale on climate change 




Chapter three: Literature Review 
In this chapter, research on presidential rhetoric and its history will be discussed. A 
brief discussion of literature on African presidential rhetoric, framing of climate 
change and climate change in Africa, will also follow. 
3.1 Presidential rhetoric 
The study of presidential rhetoric does not have a specific academic home and is 
studied from the perspectives of both the social sciences and the humanities 
(Zarefsky, 2002). The initial scholarship on the presidency focused on the institution 
itself and examined the presidential power as conferred by the constitution and 
political party (Rossitter, 1956). It was only much later that the rhetoric of the 
president found its place in the discipline of presidential studies, when attention was 
given to the president’s power as a persuader (Windt, 1986; Smith & Smith, 1994). 
Scholars asserted that any study of presidential rhetoric must discuss contributions 
by Tulis (1988). His main thesis was that before the twentieth century, it was rare to 
hear popular leadership speak directly to their people. They preferred to 
communicate between the different levels of government. Beginning his work with 
James Ceaser, Glen Thurow, Jeffrey and Joseph Bessette in 1981, Tulis was more 
concerned with the presidency than the rhetoric as he is a scholar of government 
and political theory (Medhurst, 1996).  
Tulis raised three key issues; firstly a president's performance was measured by 
their words and not actions. Secondly, presidents used popular rhetoric excessively. 
Finally, people did not understand how the political system actually worked, due to 
sometimes being misled, resulting in a possible credibility issue when performance 
and expectations did not match. 
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Medhurst (1996) argued that rhetoric had more to do with how leaders chose what to 
say, when to say to it while considering the conditions and outcome and not so much 
with their ability to persuade. He offered five principle concerns of the rhetorical 
presidency beginning with the assumption that a non-rhetorical presidency existed. 
Secondly, Medhurst posited that the term “rhetoric” as used by Tulis and his 
colleagues refers to “emotional appeals to ignorant audiences”. 
His third criticism is that political action fell short with rhetoric taking precedence and 
should be considered symbolic action. The fourth is the assumption only policy-
related rhetoric is meaningful to governance. Finally, he stated, “Aristotle may have 
written the first systematic treatise on rhetoric, but he did not write the last” 
(Medhurst, 1996). 
However, at a later stage, Tulis (1996) explained that the term “rhetorical presidency” 
to mean both the “rhetoric of any president and the newer popular form of rhetoric 
devised by modern presidents,” however “readers have tended to confine the term to 
the modern practice”. Tulis conceded that the term, although designed with several 
meanings, were confined to one. He felt that he was partly responsible for this 
happening. 
In the article with Ceasar et al. (1981) he stressed the advantages of the traditional 
presidency over the modern rhetorical presidency and that he did not abandon this 
thesis in his book but rather modified it where he attempted to describe and assess 
the ambivalence of rhetoric leadership. He argued that popular rhetoric was 
necessary in some circumstances to contend with depression and war but became 




Friedman (2007) argued that Tulis’s work is most helpful in explaining the 
“pathological aspects of modern politics” in all social democracies. On the other 
hand, Windt (1986) noted that the rhetorical presidency contributed to rhetorical 
studies. And that rhetorical presidency offered more than a mere analysis and 
criticism of presidential speeches and campaigns.  He asserted that it is a study of 
"how presidents gain, maintain, or lose public support", effectively concerning itself 
with the study of presidential public persuasion. 
Neustadt’s work came under criticism for a few reasons, mainly its timing. His 
contribution to presidential rhetoric was written prior to presidents using televisions to 
mobilise coverage and when presidential bargaining most likely among the elite 
behind closed doors. It is argued that he mistakenly equated persuasion with 
bargaining. Several political scientists are said to have since revised, repaired and 
redirected Neustadt’s work including Theodore Lowi, James Barber, Bruce 
Buchanan, Lester Seligman, George Edwards Samuel Kernell and Tulis (Smith & 
Smith, 1994). 
In other studies, Gronbeck (1996) and Benson (2003) were concerned with how 
presidents use rhetoric to their advantage as political leaders. Zarefsky (2002) 
combined political communication and political science elements, arguing that 
rhetoric was that viable option when presidents were faced with limitations of power 





Meanwhile, Edwards (1996) questioned the point of the studies on presidential 
rhetoric if scholars are not researching the impact on audiences. He pointed out 
those leading scholars of presidential rhetoric are unable to provide evidence that 
rhetoric has an impact on audiences and states that those in the field of presidential 
rhetoric should not be exempt from the same standards in which other disciplines are 
held.  
Similarly, Lim (2008) stated that “anti-intellectual presidency” is an issue because the 
quality of presidential rhetoric is problematic, with presidents saying a lot but very 
little at the same time. 
Dorsey (2002) contributed to the literature by focusing on the relationship between 
presidential rhetoric and leadership. He stated that it is difficult to define leadership 
given that the concept is “grounded in the nature and practice of rhetoric”. He noted 
the close connection between leadership and the president as a rhetorical leader. 
But he pointed out that scholars see this connection as not being ideal when leaders 
use rhetoric to influence the public which is perceived as a dangerous act.  
In the book The Presidency and Rhetorical Leadership which Dorsey edited, he 
noted that academics in this field detect presidents’ over reliance on rhetoric to 
govern. This could lead to attention take away from policy issues, replaced by a 
superficial relationship between the president and his or her constituents.  
However, Zarefsky (2004) countered these assertions. He argued that presidential 
rhetorical studies allow for new knowledge on that depicts historical and current 
events. Placing a moratorium on traditional case studies was one suggestion for 
future studies on presidential rhetoric.  
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Other suggestions included examining topics that such as the invariant features of 
presidential discourse or how can political emotion be systematised (Hart, 2002). 
More recently, Beasley (2010) offered another model, the unitary executive, which 
provides institutional reasons why presidents rely on powers of the executive branch 
as opposed to public discourse to promote their policies. Beasley (2010) argued that 
it would be beneficial to consider both models simultaneously to keep up with the 
changes as the executive office’s ability to for create and enforce public policy 
changes. 
There is a shortage of longitudinal studies of presidential rhetoric because research 
has largely been confined to individual presidents, speeches or issues. A 
considerable amount of these speeches are either inaugural or state of the nation 
addresses. By studying these speeches, the opportunity to gain insight into 
presidents’ daily rhetoric is lost. Also, presidents need to be studied in conjunction 
with each other to understand the evolution of the presidential office. The reason for 
this is when policy or political situations change; the president’s rhetoric can be 
determined by constraints and incentives (Teinken, 2013). 
Given that messages (in this case the messages are located in the speeches) are 
key places to extract rhetoric (Medhurst, 1996), this dissertation aims to understand 
the Zuma’s climate change rhetoric. In doing so, the researcher aims to narrow the 
literature gap on environmental communication and presidential rhetoric, especially 




Environmental issues have become a prominent feature in public discourse; 
however, the study of presidential rhetoric has not attended to this discourse. 
President or high-level political figures’ voices contribute to the understanding of 
climate change rhetoric because of their visibility. How presidents discuss climate 
change is also important because of the lacking scholarship in this area (Carcasson, 
2004). 
By studying presidential rhetoric on climate change, one can understand how a 
president prioritises his or her country’s needs ahead or alongside climate change. 
One can also unravel policies or emphasis placed on areas such as geo politics or 
the economic considerations of climate change (Vint, 2012).  
3.2 African Presidential Rhetoric 
As noted above, focus on presidential rhetoric of American presidents is 
comprehensive as compared to the scholarship on the rhetoric of African leaders 
which is few in number. Rhetoric has played and continues to play a significant role 
in African politics in the form of negotiations for independence, inaugural addresses, 
declarations and presidential releases. 
 Ige (2012) asserted that Africans are now beginning to look at the issue of the 
presidency. “African scholarship has not embarked on rigorous study of rhetoric and 
the gap is still very apparent.” 
It is further argued that in Africa, exists a vast amount of undocumented material on 
presidential rhetoric from the days of Kwame Nkrumah, one of the founding fathers 
of independent Africa to a series of military dictators and current leadership in the 




While it was a challenge to find studies on presidential rhetoric of climate change by 
African leaders, there were some that examine rhetorical strategies employed by a 
few. Randy (2013) examined Nigeria’s political response climate change without 
specifically looking at presidential rhetoric on the subject. 
Adegoju (2012) used critical discourse analysis to examine how President Johnson-
Sirleaf used certain rhetorical strategies in her first inaugural speech in 2006 to 
manipulate the Liberian people’s mindset to embrace her vision.  
Alo (2012) examined speeches of leaders from the five major regions (Robert 
Mugabe, Thabo Mbeki, Mwai Kibaki, John Evans Atta Mills, Olusegun Obasanjo, 
Hosni Mubarak, Joseph Kabila and Paul Biya) to see if these presidents were able to 
persuade Africans on various political and socio-economic policies and plans. 
The two studies undertaken by an international scholar assessed the rhetorical 
success of South Africa’s first two democratic leaders, former Presidents Mandela 
and Mbeki.  Sheckels (2009) identified three rhetorical strategies for the “success” of 
Thabo Mbeki 1996 “I am an African” speech. In another study, he demonstrated 
Mandela’s transition from a freedom fighter to a statesman and also asserted that 
the world icon’s rhetoric was “not entirely effective”. Sheckels (2001) argued that 
when South Africa’s challenges became more prominent, Mandela’s “language of 
suggestive certainty” declined, thus leaving Mbeki in a weaker position. 
It is not unusual that Mandela’s rhetoric was the focus of other studies, given his 
global reputation. Williams (2008) analysed four speeches of the popular statesman 
made during and just after South Africa’s transition from an apartheid state to a 
democratic one.  
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Brockett (2005) examined F.W de Klerk and Mandela’s rhetoric over a four year 
period to understand the pair’s respective rhetorical visions of a new South Africa 
and how these strategies were used to identify with their audiences.  
Ige (2012) noted that studies, while not strictly focused on rhetorical analysis and 
rhetorical theory, offered primary data which are rhetorical in nature. He stated that 
there is an opportunity for scholars not just those in the field of rhetoric  or  linguistics 
but others in political  science,  sociology,  public  management  and  peace  and  
conflict  studies,  to  readily  incorporate  rhetoric  into  their  research. 
The review of literature indicates the wide gap in rhetorical studies both in climate 
change and presidential rhetoric as it relates to Africa. 
3.3 The framing of climate change 
Nisbet (2009) stated that although frames provide lenses through which journalists 
write stories or policy makers define their policies or people discuss an issue, 
framing is not the same thing as spinning an issue, even though some do exploit this 
concept to their benefit. He therefore notes that framing is an “attempt to remain true 
to what is conventionally known about an issue” while placing more emphasis on 
some parts of an issue than others. 
Recent studies of the construction of global climate change in the US media, French 
media, and German media () demonstrated interesting discrepancies concerning the 





There have been a great number of studies on the media coverage of climate 
change and recent ones in France and Germany continued to show that the 
uncertainty around the science is still prevalent. These studies also highlighted the 
discrepancies in the European and US media coverage of climate change (Boykoff 
and Boykoff, 2004; Boykoff, 2008; Brossard et al., 2004 & Weingart et al., 2000). 
Media coverage has been increasing in some countries (Fioravanti, 2007). However, 
dependence on content from international sources, lack of resources or 
understanding of the complex subject, unsupportive editors and a lack of training are 
some of the challenges still faced by media, particularly in Africa (Tagbo, 2010 & 
Cramer 2008).  
Studies showed that in South Africa media reported on climate change as an 
environmental, economic or political story mainly in the print media, but did not link it 
to broader development issues, such as poverty, unemployment and inequality. 
Reports on the effects of climate change on South Africans and policies related to 
climate change are also lacking. Media reports stemmed from international news 
agencies and results in the absence of an African voice (Bosch, 2012; Cramer, 2008 
& Tagbo; 2012). 
In addition to media grappling with climate change, studies in some countries show 
that some sections of the public lack basic understanding of climate change or global 
warming. This can be detrimental to people’s safety, even in SA where extreme 
weather conditions have resulted in deaths, if they remain unaware of what actions 
to take (Neville, 2010; Brechin, 2003 & Bulkeley, 2000). Moser & Dilling (2007) 
argued that science alone cannot get people to change their behaviour; it has done 
its part in showing that people’s actions have mostly contributed to the problem.  
61 
 
Therefore, the distribution of information is important because it can lead to 
behavioural change but it can also garner public support for government policies 
(Bulkeley, 2000). There needs to be communication among key stakeholders - 
scientists, politicians, and the public – on climate change if the public are able to 
engage on this complex challenge (Solomon et al. 2007).  
Thus framing is also important because the public needs to be able to understand if 
politicians are using climate risk for their own purposes. This understanding would 
mean that the public could make appropriate demands from their government 
leaders (Agwu & Amu, 2013).  
Thematic framing focuses on how an issue is presented generally while episodic 
framing, according to Iyengar (1991) has more to do with the provision of a case 
study on a particular issue. Hart (2011) demonstrated that people who were exposed 
to thematic framing of scientific information were more likely to support climate 
change policies as compared to those people who received information that 
employed episodic framing.  
3.4 Climate change in Africa  
There is consensus both politically and scientifically that climate change poses a 
threat to Africa. If attention is not paid to adaptation, mitigation and compensation, 
efforts to reduce poverty for example, will be derailed (Taderera, 2010).  
There are two important arguments to consider when it comes to climate change 
literature in relation to Africa. The first is that most countries on the continent 
contribution to CO2 emissions are insignificant yet these countries are more 




The fifth IPPC report contends that Africa will experience further stresses to the 
water availability and substantial impact on its ecosystems. The continent must also 
prepare for a rise in climate-relevant health issues. This alone could exacerbate 
Africa’s challenges of poverty and health issues. Literature that suggests that there 
has been a growing interest in climate change as a driver of conflict since the late 
1990s and it posing a security issue and increasing the risk of violent conflict on the 
continent (Barnett & Adger, 2007; Ki Moon, 2007). 
According to Brown, Hammill & McCleman (2007) there has been a shift in climate 
change language, conjuring threats to international peace and security and where 
Africa is most likely to bear the brunt of the conflicts. But Norda & Gleditsch (2007) 
cautions that more scientific research is needed to confirm the link between climate 
change and conflict 
Thus it is imperative for African leaders to use science to determines their national 
positions on climate change policy, which should also consider all the impacts (both 
negative and positive) and  national key vulnerabilities.  
In the developing world, African countries in particular fall short when it comes to 
promote identifying to arguing for their national key vulnerabilities (Ramos & Khala, 
2009). 
The arguments made for clear national positions are significant as the second point 





African countries are referred to as developing nations and grouped with 
heavyweights such as India, China, Brazil and even South Africa, whose economic 
needs and goals differ vastly. Mumma (2010) argued that Africa’s marginalisation in 
climate talks stems from the continent being unable to articulate a position that 
shows its unique challenges or circumstances. The inability for African countries to 
inarticulate and highlight their positions stems from their limited financial, technical 
and human. In addition, larger developing countries such as India and China are 
drawing more attention to their vulnerabilities.  
South Africa has been criticised for letting down their African counterparts at 
international climate talks, especially Copenhagen and Cancún. South Africa signed 
the first stage of the Kyoto Protocol, without resistance, but was not an Annexure 1 
country and therefore was not legally bound to cap emissions. For poorer countries, 
mitigating climate change is a justice issue that needs equitable distribution. It’s not 
even about if or when they should employ mitigation initiatives. But these countries 
have experienced unfavourable bargaining positions (Shukla, 1999).  
According to Bond (2011), SA now a part of larger emerging economies during the 
second stage, was keen to retain the North-South differentiation of responsibility to 
cut emissions. In addition, government was also eager to get rid of the Kyoto’s 
binding targets or establish complicated offsets and carbon trades. This proposal 




Chapter four: Methodology 
 
Language is a key component in a rhetorical strategy especially in a political domain 
but so are “premises of agreement”. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) 
maintained the value of the idea of an audience in traditional rhetoric. They argued 
that while speech is addressed to an audience, written text too is produced for an 
audience in the form of readers. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) 
the starting point of any argument has a “premises of agreement” between rhetoric 
and his or her construction of the audience. The establishment of such premises is 
considered as “a preparation for argument which not only establishes the elements 
but constitutes the first step in the utilisation of these elements for persuasive 
purposes”. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) acknowledged that while a complete list of 
everything capable of constituting an object or belief cannot be drawn, there are five 
premises of agreement that can be established: “facts and truths, presumptions, 
values, hierarchies, and loci”.  These five premises are split into two categories, real 
and preferable.  The real category comprises facts, truth and presumptions while the 
preferable relates to values, hierarchies and lines of argument. 
Facts and truths are grouped into one category, but represent two variations of ideas 
that are based on “data, objective reality, and thoughts common to all’’ (Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). Facts and truths are said to be ‘‘binding on everybody’’ but 
when challenged by audiences can lose its status as a fact. Presumptions enjoy 
“universal agreement” and is connected to what is “normal and likely” until there is 
proof to the contrary.  
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Values are an agreement which requires that an ideal, being or object must be able 
to influence action and that one can make use of this influence in an argument.   
Values enter some stage of an argument more so in political arguments. Values are 
divided into concrete (normally these values are attached to something living or a 
specific group or particular object) and abstract values such as justice and truth. 
Hierarchies, too, are considered either concrete or abstract and are closely 
associated with values while loci refer to headings which arguments can be 
classified (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). 
Drawing on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work, this MA thesis uses the 
rhetorical criticism approach, which seeks to understand how language is used to 
impact an audience when a wide range of topics are analysed. This chapter will 
elaborate on the selected sample and expand on the methodology.  
It is important to mention here that rhetoric criticism is a qualitative research that is 
certainly very challenging because of rich and complex history. According to Snape 
& Spencer (2003) qualitative methods assist researchers to answer questions that 
seek to explain or understand social phenomena that often have complex natures.  
Politicians are sometimes accused of making empty promises or simply using 
“rhetoric” which is synonymous with negativity. However, in this context, this 
connation of rhetoric is not applicable. Here, rhetorical criticism refers to a 
“qualitative research method designed for systematic investigation and explanation 
of symbolic acts and artifacts” (in this case Zuma’s speeches) for the “purpose of 
understanding rhetorical processes” (Foss, 2004). 
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For the purposes of this study, this analysis is meant to achieve “subjective 
interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process 
of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Snape & Spencer, 2003). 
Rhetorical scholars’ interest in studying political speeches goes beyond a summary 
of the content but seeks to understand the rhetorical appeal and the ethical and 
political implications of the speech (Williams, Young & Launer, 2012). Modern day 
presidents are expected to make several speeches pertaining to key national events, 
conditions, and conflicts that arise under their administration. Their decision to make 
speeches will depend on whether they choose to confront or avoid issues (Ragsdale, 
1984).  
The researcher chose to examine Zuma’s speeches over other African leaders and 
two other SA presidents because COP17 happened in the year Zuma was president 
of the country.  Zuma made several speeches and was present for several sessions 
of the COP in Durban in different settings.  Studying his speeches is vital because 
within a global text the president would also have to act on national interests just like 
his counterparts. 
Medhurst (2011) stated that any presidents’ rhetoric is subjected to more attention 
than most people whether it’s deserved or not. A president’s rhetoric found in 
inaugural or state of the nation addresses, campaign discourse (including social 
media and other internet presence) and impromptu reactions has become subject to 
scrutiny.  Modern presidencies produce more rhetoric, largely due to the availability 
of media that is in operation 24 hours a day, and to audiences at home and across a 
country’s border. Tienken (2013) noted the increase too in the number of presidential 
speeches and argued that the purpose of presidential rhetoric has changed. 
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In this thesis, rhetorical criticism is thus used to analyse 18 speeches (inclusive of 
the ministers press statements that were read out to the media) - a combination of 
Zuma’s and two of his ministers. This dissertation is undertaken with two intentions. 
The first is to use rhetoric analysis to contribute to the development of the SA 
rhetorical presidency while the second is to contribute to knowledge of how the 
modern presidency uses the personal mode of persuasion.  
4.1 Method 
For purposes of rhetorical criticism, the researcher will seek to understand how often 
Zuma makes value statements regarding his political agenda and whether he 
adheres to ANC norms and this will be considered a measure of success. 
Rhetorical criticism, is one of four approaches to textual analysis, and is a qualitative 
method that will be used in this thesis.  Researchers in the communication field use 
textual analysis as a method to “describe and interpret the characteristics of a 
recorded or visual message”. When researchers conduct textual analysis, they are 
interested in describing texts in relation to its content, structure and functions (Frey, 
Botan & Kreps, 1999). 
Rhetorical criticism offers important contributions to improving communicators’ 
abilities to perform their jobs, more than it contributes to theory. Knowledge derived 
from rhetorical criticism empowers communicators and gives them options to 





Scholars are implored to ask critical questions that relate to effects that are 
answerable by reasoned argument. Such questions include how are Zuma’s 
speeches constructed to invite or discourage certain reactions? What role might his 
speeches play in a more comprehensive campaign to modify attitudes or behaviour? 
Who are the various possible audiences for the speech? (Brockriede, 1974) 
A brief introduction by Foss (2004) to rhetorical criticism method offers four basic 
steps when conducting rhetorical criticism studies: “selecting an artifact; analysing 
the artifact; formulating a research question; and finally writing the essay with focus 
on its contribution to rhetorical theory”. She argued that this method allows scholars 
to think about communication in new or different ways. These basic tools, she said, 
helps scholars to learn how to balance “between letting the data speak and 
categorizing the data, how to be patient, and how to create a theory.”  
Rhetorical critics have the most to offer because they look for new ways to frame 
existing knowledge, new insights that produce new knowledge, and new possibilities 
for communicating (Foss & Foss, 2013).  
This approach seemed appropriate for this study although the researcher did 
consider work of other rhetorical critics. For example, Burke’s work in A Rhetoric of 
Motives (1950) would have been used if the purpose of this study was to understand 
how Zuma used aligning symbols in his speeches. Alternatively, Lakoff’s thoughts in 
Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things (1987) and Moral Politics (1996) could have 
informed the researcher should she wished to study how Zuma used “familiar 




In analysing Mandela’s rhetoric, Sheckels (2010) employed Hart’s verbal content 
analysis because words have “become crucial tools in the rhetorical presidency, with 
tonal nuances that suggest the attitudes that the president wants his audience to 
share.” 
Methodologically, the researcher followed these procedures: conducted a close 
textual reading of all speeches, noted the critical and theoretical observations of the 
text, analysed the texts according to the code sheet. 
4.2 Sample 
For the sake of this specific subject matter, the researcher has focused on speeches 
within a specific timeframe that relates to climate change rhetoric by the president.  It 
is thus a purposive (also called judgement sampling) non probability sample that was 
used.  This sampling type is advantageous when a scholar wants to “construct a 
historical reality, describe a phenomenon or develop something about which only a 
little is known” (Kumar, 2010). 
The advantage to this sampling meant that the researcher had control over the 
selection process and was able to include key political actors such as the ministers. 
The researcher is aware that the findings of this thesis cannot be generalised even 
within the South African context; however it enables the research to go in-depth 
about this issue that is highly controversial matter in a society that is vulnerable and 
is overwhelmed with historical baggage and many inequalities at different socio-
political and economic fronts.  
Scholars asserted that purposive sampling is a favourable choice in qualitative 




Ten speeches delivered by President Jacob Zuma from October 2011 (the build up 
to) COP17 until December 2011 (in which the conference ended) will be analysed. 
Of the ten speeches, two speeches were geared towards the business community; 
two towards civil society and the remaining were directed to different segments of 
COP 17, including opening and closing sessions and those at high level political 
audiences. 
A further eight speeches from Ministers Nkoana-Mashabane and Molewa, also 
sourced from the Government Communications website were analysed. These 
speeches were sourced from the Presidential website. Some of these speeches 
were made to the press during the COP. The speeches were limited to COP17 as 
this was a global event hosted by South Africa in Durban, which resulted in the 
President having to address different audiences including the business, civic and 
political sectors 
The aim of the study is to understand how government communicates climate 
change therefore with this clear purpose in mind, nonprobability sampling would be 
advantageous. Generalisations are not the aim of the study; therefore this is an 
appropriate sample. 
4.3 Presidential rhetoric 
Presidential rhetoric studies in recent times have fallen into four categories, “criticism 
of single speeches, criticism of rhetorical movements, development of genres of 
presidential speeches, and miscellaneous articles on various ancillary topics dealing 




With single speeches scholars largely pay attention to inaugural addresses, which 
tends to be ceremonial or crisis speeches which normally follows a declaration of 
one by a president. It is argued that the intrinsic value of critically analysing the 
single speech is that it deepens the understanding of what worked or did not based 
on a particular speech. 
 When criticism is extrinsic, raw material could be provided to increase knowledge on 
how a president uses his persuasive powers to meet his goals or to develop theories 
about presidential rhetoric and this is an area which is lacking (Windt, 1986). 
Zarefsky (2012) also argued that single speeches need to be examined in tandem 
within broader cultural and social frames to have discernible effects. 
There are a series of questions that a scholar could ask about the plausibility, 
consistency, rhetorical strategies, consequences of speeches on target 
constituencies, among others about presidents’ speeches to contribute to an 
improved understanding of “how public arguments and presidential speeches affect 
the President, his policies, and the continuous political debates about our national 
agenda and the direction of public policy” (Windt, 1986). 
The focus of rhetorical movements places individual speeches in proper political 
contexts as scholars get to experience how a president uses rhetoric to build 
constituencies, defend his policies and get legislation passed. The focus on genre 
studies seeks to understand how presidents employed rhetorical strategies on 




It is argued that scholars who used this method rely on their knowledge of past 
rhetorical activities to examine contemporary rhetorical efforts. Finally, miscellaneous 
research exists in the forms of “textual accuracy, speech preparation, quantitative 
research, arguments over the ethics of using speech-writers”. These analyses 
contribute to knowledge on how presidents use rhetoric to exercise power (Windt, 
1986). 
Windt (1986) stated that over the course of history, there has been a shift in 
inaugural address. Initially in the US, inaugural speeches were about how the 
incoming presidency could uphold republican and Constitutional principles. 
Nowadays, the point of inaugural addresses centre around an attempt "to articulate 
the unspoken desires of the people by holding out a vision for their fulfilment."  
Campbell & Jamieson (2008) argued that State of the Union addresses has three 
functions. These are values transmission, discussion of key issues of national 
concern, and recommendations on policy. Combining specific ceremonial and 
deliberative functions, this address therefore presents challenges to presidents. The 
difficulty lies in the delicate balance between expressing lofty ideals and demarcating 
specific programs and policies, while labouring under the time constraints posed by 
the genre as a modern mediated event. 
One of the main reasons that states of the union addresses or inaugural speeches 
have been subjected to several studies is that there is a foundation for comparisons 
to be drawn. However, these types of speeches are of a ceremonial nature. South 
Africans, like their American counterparts, have more access or interactions with 
speeches. Thus other speeches aside from the ceremonial ones must now become 
the focus of presidential studies (Teinken, 2013). 
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4.4 Research Question 
A president’s rhetoric reaches different audiences, oscillating between a general 
audience and party specific audience. A reasonable assumption suggests that the 
success of presidential rhetoric vary in the way concrete values and abstract values 
are used on different occasions and based on these thought, the following research 
question was proposed. 
RQ1: How successfully did President Jacob Zuma adhere to the kinds of values that 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) asserted are typical for audience members 
predisposed to ANC ideology? 
Accordingly, a number of sub questions will be addressed here: 
RQ2: What is the master narrative of Zuma’s speeches on climate change? 
RQ3: How does Zuma frame climate change in relation to South Africa’s priorities 
such as poverty, rural development, education and job creation?  
RQ4: How does Zuma represent Africa as a leader of a major developing country? 
RQ5: Does Zuma focus on justice as a concern as it relates to climate change and 
the continent? 
RQ6: To what extent was there alignment in communication among Zuma and his 
two key ministers during COP17? 





A coding sheet (Appendix 1) was created to note the frequency of certain concrete 
values (for instance climate impact, drought and floods and so forth) and abstract 
values (such as justice, responsibility etc.). In order to limit bias the researcher did 
not include a category that identified other parties or party leaders in SA as this study 
pertained specifically to the SA presidency which is led by an ANC leader. 
The coding consisted of assigning a tally mark next to the variables in each category, 
which the researcher then used to calculate the total frequency of each type of value.  
This MA dissertation could be used by media members as reference points as the 
president continue to address the issue of climate change publically. SA’s civic 
societies deal with environmental and climate change issues could also benefit from 
a theoretical understanding of the president’s rhetoric on climate change. 
By using the master narratives, speechwriters could either build on these themes or 
include issues that were identified as lacking. These rhetorical choices could 
influence the initial bond of agreement with their audiences. Critics can also 











Chapter five: Findings 
This chapter contains the research findings. It provides an understanding of Zuma’s 
climate change rhetoric by primarily identifying the values and master narratives in 
his speeches. The focus on what his predecessors communicated as well as two 
members of his cabinet active at the time of COP17 illustrates similarities and/or 
differences in climate change rhetoric.  
After completing a close reading of the selected speeches, the researcher coded for 
key words and phrases. The parameters of these keys words and phrases were 
informed by the extensive theoretical framework and literature review which focused 
mainly on climate change justice and presidential rhetoric. The researcher also 
briefly examined speeches outside COP17 such as Zuma’s State of the Nation 
Addresses from the start of his presidency in 2009 until the conclusion of the Durban 
talks.  
The data was then grouped into sub sections: Zuma’s master narratives, SA and 
climate change, Africa and climate change, justice and climate change, Climate 
change and SA leaders which answered the research questions under broader 




5.1 Zuma’s master narratives 
There has been very little rhetoric on climate change since the start of Zuma’s 
presidency. In his 2009 SONA, Zuma briefly spoke about implementing the “Water 
for Growth and Development strategy”, to strengthen the country’s water 
management system. He acknowledged that this development as a mitigation 
measure. Without directly addressing climate change, the president mentioned that 
government will “continue to improve our energy efficiency and reliance on 
renewable energy” (Zuma, 2009). 
In his 2010 SONA, Zuma spoke about “SA’s Industrial Policy Action Plan” and the 
country’s new focus on green jobs. This is the only SONA in which Zuma mentioned 
global policy on climate change. He referred to the BASIC countries and the US 
making a “significant contribution to the accord adopted in Copenhagen”. Zuma also 
committed to working with the global community on a legally binding treaty. In 2011, 
the year of COP17 there was no mention of climate change in his SONA (Zuma, 
2010). 
The brief summary of climate change content in the SONAs demonstrated that 
Zunma gives priority to other socio-economic challenges over the global 
environmental challenge. Even in its 2009 election manifesto, the ANC mentioned 
climate change in direct relation to developing green jobs and that these “jobs should 





Three key frames have been identified: the blame, balance and responsibility 
frames.  
Blame frame: developing versus developed worlds 
The results indicated that Zuma clearly distinguished between the developing and 
developed countries in all his speeches, delivered to mainly high level country 
delegations during COP17. This divide was used when Zuma spoke about the 
history and negotiations of climate change. This distinction is central to his 
arguments made from COP15 throughout COP17, more so if the speech was 
delivered to audiences at the high level political sessions. 
By drawing the distinction, Zuma’s rhetoric employed the blame frame in the most 
explicit terms.  He emphatically used the phrases such as “some facts are already 
well known” or “it is common knowledge” to qualify his statements that the 
“developed countries are historically responsible for 80 percent of the emissions in 
the atmosphere” or that “developed countries benefitted from a high level of 
emissions for their own development”. 
This frame is supported by research that has shown that developing nations have 
contributed minimally to GHGs emissions but have suffered the effects of climate 
change due to their vulnerable nature. These countries’ exposure to poverty and 
related challenges, such as lack of proper infrastructure and access to healthcare 




Zuma did not single out his administration or any particular sector as culprits of 
climate change in SA or Africa. He briefly acknowledged SA’s contribution to climate 
change but places more emphasis on SA’s current challenges rather than who is 
responsible for climate change. He did use the country’s history to support his 
arguments for economic development.  
He takes his audience on a historical tour that shows the current disparities between 
the developed and under developed areas in South Africa. He also emphasises that 
SA’s reputation for being “one of the most energy intensive economies in the world” 
started a long time before SA moved into a democratic dispensation. 
While Zuma acknowledged that SA is more developed compared to other developing 
nations, he reminded his audience that there are still several villages and townships 
that need development. He supported his argument by reminding his listeners that 
South Africans still suffer the effects of economic and political exclusion. 
Balance frame 
Zuma uses the balance frame which according to Carcasson (2004) is a combination 
of the economic and environmental frame. He repeatedly uses this frame, structuring 
his arguments around the belief that “sustainable development and economics 
should be at the heart of the climate change discussions”. 
Vint (2012) demonstrated that former American Presidents George W Bush and Bill 
Clinton also strategically employed the balance frame. Similarly, Zuma advocated for 
“faster economic growth” which he firmly believes must be achieved alongside “the 
sustainable management of SA’s natural resources” (Appendix 2). 
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Acknowleding that climate change is a daunting problem especially in developing 
countries, Zuma, also stated that policies for adapting and mitigating these 
challenges cannot come at the expense of “economic growth and poverty eradication  
in developing countries” (Appendix 3). 
Zuma also strategically employed this frame when he stressed the need for funding 
for clean development mechanisms, innovation, new technologies and models for 
investment. However, he repeatedly also argued that sustainable development and 
innovation measures must be a conceivable option for developing countries. 
He contextualised this frame predominantly by talking about a green economy, which 
he saw as “reducing rather than increasing resource consumption” and will give rise 
to green growth and green jobs. This is in line with government policies for a wider 
economic regime in the country in which job creation is a major aspiration. 
This strategy then paves way for Zuma’s closely related narrative which states that 
developed nations must lead the way in climate change adaptation and mitigation 
and must provide financial support and technological mechanisms to developing 
countries. Zuma acknowledged that climate change affected the whole world and 
that every country must take responsibility in contributing to the solution. However, 
he often places the responsibility to drive the process on the developed world. 
Developing countries are ready to play their part in reducing global emissions, 
but obviously rich countries have to take the lead (Appendix 10). 
Zuma’s rhetoric appeared to have served two purposes; to show the intention to 
address climate change but to also indicate that creating equity is SA’s priority too.  
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Growth would also need to be inclusive of all people, because according to Zuma 
“experience shows that growth does not in itself necessarily overcome exclusion and 
marginalisation”. The president emphasises that growth ties in with “education and 
healthcare, infrastructure, access to land and finance” (Appendix 4).   
Zuma stated that global solutions from state parties are needed to address climate 
change. But when he addressed local audiences he was persistent that a collective 
effort is needed to tackle climate change as noted in the White Paper. He used 
practical examples to make his point. For example, Zuma said in order to introduce 
new sources of electricity, government would need to regulate the national grid:  
It needs business to invest and bring its technological and managerial 
expertise to the table. Labour will be required to support the necessary 
training and to help fund projects through investment from members’ 
retirement savings for instance. That kind of collaboration is the only way we 
can make a greener economy possible in economic, social and political terms.  
Beyond the narrow economic needs of transformation, we must also ensure 
that everyone gets something out of the process.  (Appendix 5) 
By situating the developing world’s position as the disadvantaged, the results 
showed that Zuma’s master narrative is then that developing countries should be 
subjected to CBDR. The researcher analysed the speeches for master narrative in 
relation to both SA and Africa and found that this predominant argument had 




It was common for Zuma to argue that CBDR is a necessity because the developing 
countries would have to increase their emissions due to their development paths. He 
argued that CDBR has been a consistent principle in the international convention on 
climate change. 
The main emphasis was not on South Africa’s high emission rates but rather it’s 
“right” to develop to address its economic challenges. Therefore by focusing on 
CBDR, Zuma intertwined South Africa’s need for development with that of his African 
counterparts or other developing nations. 
Responsibility frame 
CBDR, now a highly politicised concept and a massive stumbling block, was crucial 
to climate change negotiations in the 1990s. Under the earlier Conventions, 
countries were divided in Annex 1 (Industrialised nations) and non-Annex 1 parties 
(Developing nations). Pauw & et al (2014) argued that CBDR is no longer indicative 
of scientific knowledge or political realities currently resulting in a dysfunctional 
system of international climate policy. 
South Africa’s position on CBDR has always been consistent – government 
acknowledges that while it should reduce its GHG emissions, it should not be at the 
expense of its development goals. The country’s focus has always been on 
economic growth and development to get the majority of its people out of poverty, 
therefore in their rhetoric the SA government place great emphasis on their need to 





Zuma also reminded his ministers that climate change policy requires “principles of  
multilateralism, environmental integrity, CBDR and respective capabilities, equity, 
and honouring of all international commitments and undertakings made in the 
climate change process” (Zuma,  2011). 
Following Zuma’s extensive focus on CBDR another popular narrative during climate 
change negotiations was to push for a legally binding commitment to the Kyoto 
protocol.  
There is a general understanding that parties should positively and decisively 
resolve the question of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, 
which commits developed countries to cut their emissions of greenhouse 
gases (Appendix 3). 
The results showed that Zuma considered climate change to be a “practical issue” 
and repeatedly argued that funding mechanisms from the developed world to 
developing nations are needed to address the issue. Closely linked to funding, the 
results indicated that Zuma drew a close link between poverty and climate change. 
Africa’s vulnerability does not only stem from climate change impacts such as 
the rise in the sea level, severe droughts and floods. Africa is more vulnerable 
because of poverty which limits the ability of most African nations to cope with 
the impact of climate change. Agricultural output in many African countries is 
expected to decrease by as much as 50% by the year 2050, which will cause 




Zuma used the same argument during COP16 and COP17 stressing that developing 
countries needed to provide political direction by “encouraging developed countries 
to provide adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources, technology and 
capacity building for adaptation action in developing countries” (Appendix 11). 
During the Durban talks, Zuma specifically spoke about the Green Climate Fund, 
demanding that it becomes operational. The merit in this rhetoric is supported in the 
Stern Review. The reality for developing countries, already hit hard by climate 
change, is that millions of people will be forced into deeper poverty if adaptation 
measures are not implemented. There is difficulty in estimating adaptation costs but 
it is expected to run into billions and therefore developed nations should be 
compelled to honour their existing commitments to increase aid to the world’s 
poorest countries (Stern, 2007).  
Giddens (2009) is also of the view that “financial assistance from the rich to the 
poorer nation must focus much more on adaptation than has been the case up until 
now”. He argued that underdeveloped countries would need finance to begin to 
assess their vulnerabilities even before the finance can be utilised to address 
adaptation measures. There has been little progress in linking adaptation to existing 
poverty-alleviation programmes. 
Zuma argued that finance remains a key issue in climate change because it will 
allow for resilient societies to be built. An idea that Giddens (2007) supported 
because he believes government adaptation policies should focus on strengthening 
that resilience as even poor people are not normally without resources.  
There is little emphasis placed on the science of climate change in Zuma’s rhetoric. 
In fact, he has argued that enough research has been conducted and that more is 
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not necessarily needed. He stated that action should be a priority, given that political 
inertia on this subject has been there for a long time (Appendix 6). 
5.2 Climate change and SA’s socio-economic challenges 
Specific to SA, the results showed that Zuma mainly focussed on green job creation 
and economic development as the main path in dealing with climate change. Much 
of the rhetoric centres on policy, especially the New Growth Plan (NGP) and the 
green economy and not necessarily the White Paper. 
Zuma’s audiences were subjected to explanations of the NGP South Africa’s “vision 
to place jobs and decent work at the centre of economic policy” (Appendix 5). The 
plan envisions creating five million new jobs to be created by 2020. In this policy, 
focus is on the emissions intensity of growth. Three of the most important areas for 
achieving that goal are renewable and nuclear energy, green transport and the built 
environment. 
Zuma also focused on the Green Economy Accord, in which government, business 
and labour signed in 2011, with the goal creating 300 000 jobs within the next 10 
years. Zuma explained that the accord will result in the creation of opportunities 
around “renewable energy; biofuels; cleaner coal; more energy efficient technologies 
for production and greening buildings” (Appendix 5). 
Zuma addressed poverty as an issue affecting the developing world but on a few 
occasions mentioned that one of “South Africa’s major challenges for poverty 
eradication particularly in the rural communities, is access to electricity. People have 
to burn wood and coal to get some sort of energy which causes health-related 
problems such as pneumonia and asthma” (Appendix 9). 
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In terms of policy, the White Paper did not receive as much attention as compared to 
the NGP and Green Economy Accord. When Zuma did speak about the White Paper 
he once again referred to how government was implementing strategies towards 
cleaner technology and transition towards a low carbon future. 
Zuma did situate South Africa as a “responsible global citizen... contributing its fair 
share to the global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions”. But at the same time 
Zuma told his audiences that South Africa acknowledges that it is the “largest 
producer of electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa, generating 90% of our electricity from 
coal”. (Appendix 4).He also clarified that until South Africa operates in a low carbon 
economy, the country will continue to use coal to meet its developmental challenges. 
It is statements like these that indicate the economic growth remains a main priority 
for the SA government, often at the expense of the environment. 
Zuma’s rhetoric generally pertained to the country as a whole rather than 
communities or specific reference to a group of people. Therefore highlighting how 
climate change impacts directly on women or the youth for example was 
communicated through the broader South African population.  
But during one of his addresses Zuma spoke about the “economic empowerment of 
the black majority” and how he understood that growth is needed to addresses 
gender inequalities, so that women can find real opportunities in the economy. When 
he spoke about youth, he also considered their access to economic opportunities 
rather than what younger South African are doing or thinking about when it comes to 




There was no focus on how climate change impacts on women and children on a 
personal level. At the same time, Zuma does not generally refer to success stories of 
ordinary South Africans who are making great strides to alleviate the impact of 
climate change on their lives. 
Considering Zuma’s emphasis on the green economy conceptualised in the White 
Paper as a vehicle to “promote investment in human and productive resources”, a 
quick search of COP17 articles in the daily newspapers shows that there will were no 
real debate on what constituted green jobs or if the green economy was something 
more than rhetoric. In a critique of the media coverage of the White Paper Smith 
(2013) found there was limited coverage on this important policy, let alone raging 
debates relating to climate change. 
For example, Zuma established that poverty is an issue in Africa and that climate 
change stands in the way of development that would address the challenge which 
affected people in all regions of the continent. 
We need to link climate change, food security and poverty;  we  need to 
engage on emerging issues including finance and technological support and 
approaches such as Climate-Smart Agriculture that are geared towards 
addressing food security, adaptation and mitigation (Appendix 8) 
On a more general note, Zuma predominantly used specific frames. Politicians use 
these frames to overtly link governmental activities with targets in society. Even 
though the policies Zuma mentioned did not mainly focus on the environment, it 





5.3 Climate change and Africa 
In his divide between the developing and developed world, the researcher found that 
Zuma referred to Africa more generally in his speeches. That means Zuma 
occasionally singled out countries such as Sudan and Kenya, mentioning extreme 
weather patterns in those nations. He did not speak about policies of these countries 
or regions. In fact, to bring back the focus on the continent’s struggle with climate 
change, Zuma used phrases such as “Africa and the developing world” or the 
“developing world, especially Africa”. Zuma also did not talk about SA’s role in 
driving negotiations with other African countries beyond mentioning that Africa is part 
of the G77. 
In one instance when Zuma was addressing the Nobel Laureate Symposium 
on Global Sustainability, he used the opportunity to demonstrate the African 
struggle more than he did during any other speech. Zuma even referred to 
recurrent resource-induced conflicts, which is an argument lacking in his other 
addresses (Appendix 7). 
The findings also indicated that Zuma used his addresses to highlight Africa’s need 
to receive funding and other resources to respond to climate change. There were 
two occasions when it appeared that Zuma took a more leadership approach, with 
more commanding rhetoric. In the Nobel Laureate Symposium, Zuma spoke about 
how climate change despite all its challenges could also provide the continent with 
an opportunity. He argued that Africa can no longer simply be the producer of raw 
materials but should “build dynamic and competitive manufacturing sectors”.  This 
kind of rhetoric is generally absent in his other speeches. 
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In a speech to the audience at World Climate Business Summit on Green Business 
Generation (Appendix 4) Zuma noted that Africa and many developing countries 
because of their “abundant natural resources” have plenty opportunities for green 
growth. He elaborated by proposing that alternative energy be developed and 
investment in areas such as “marine aquaculture development, wildlife management, 
waste services and ecosystem rehabilitation programmes” be considered. 
This is a shift from his general rhetoric as Zuma does not make these arguments 
when his audiences are high level politicians or negotiating delegates because his 
position is clear in those cases, that Africa and the developing world need 
agreements with CBDR and funding mechanisms. 
The researcher detected some emotive language in the official opening address for 
COP17, which is not something he uses often. His choice of words was more 
concrete when he said “for most people in the developing world and Africa, climate 
change is a matter of life and death”. Even when he spoke about how solutions for 
climate change cannot be independent from resolutions for poverty eradication Zuma 
goes back to taking a more clinical or formal approach to language (Appendix 3). 
While there is a sense of solidarity with Africa as the continent is included in one side 
of the divide, the developing world, very little rhetoric is focused on opportunities for 
partnerships between regions or countries. He did mention an agreement between 
SA and the Democratic Republic of Congo with respect to the “Grand Inga Hydro 
Electricity Project for the construction of a dam that will provide electricity to more 
than half of Africa’s population” (Appendix 3). More than that, there is little in Zuma’s 
rhetoric that makes Africa come across as a unified continent that is able to 
negotiate policies on the own terms. 
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5.4 Justice and climate change 
One of the key questions this thesis looked at was how successfully Zuma adheres 
to the kinds of values that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) asserted are 
typical for audience members predisposed to ANC ideology. The researcher found 
that Zuma uses most of the values (facts and truths, presumptions, values, 
hierarchies, and loci) noted by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) in his 
addressees.  
He especially used truths and facts.  As the president of the host country of COP17 
Zuma utilised the opportunity to use rhetoric that is commonly accepted as fact. For 
example, when he addressed the local government and cities convention, he drew 
the audience to the fact that it is this sphere of government that is most close to the 
people when it comes to implementing climate change response programmes. 
He drew correlations between how local government should see the relevance to 
climate change because of the link to poverty in the developing world. He did this by 
reminding delegates that local government is closest to the people and that this 
sphere of the State is also “directly responsible for the implementation of climate 
change response programmes” (Appendix 2). 
Zuma’s messages were tailored on how climate change exacerbates poverty. He 
gently reminded his audience that if climate change goes unchecked at the lowest 
level of government, that they will be subjected to more vulnerability. To emphasise 
his point about the importance of municipalities’ role in addressing climate change 
challenges, Zuma referred to the situation in his own country in which disaster 




Zuma acknowledged that climate change policy in the developing nations must 
consider poverty because it is a condition that these nations are already challenged 
with. Zuma’s climate justice strategy is closely linked to funding from developed 
nations and CBDR because it is on these two points that he speaks about justice, 
equity and fairness. 
Fact – either accepted (observe) or agreed (facts that are probable or possible) are 
often used in Zuma’s rhetoric because he raised issues that are common to several 
developing countries, even though countries in these brackets are not always in 
complete agreement. Such issues include the idea that developing nations should be 
allowed to advance their economies without severe restrictions to their global 
emissions.  
The use of abstract values in Zuma’s speeches, concepts such as fairness, balance 
and justice, are “essentially connected to change” according to Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969). Zuma’s usage of such values is in a way calling for change 
but mainly for action. He demanded change in the speed at which financial aid 
becomes more accessible to developing nations to address climate change.  
Zuma did not use the word justice in his addresses but often spoke about the 
concepts related to it such as distribution, responsibility, fairness, balance and equity 
(Vanderheiden, 2008). The president spoke about these concepts in relation to 
mainly policy, when he urges all parties to “strive for a balanced, fair and credible 
outcome that can pass any test of environmental integrity”. 
His arguments of these values are predominantly found in his approach to climate 
change policy, that there must be differentiated responsibility because of the divide 
between the developed and developing world.  
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The focus of justice and fairness as it directly relates to people is not a prominent 
feature in Zuma’s arguments. Zuma on one occasion spoke about South Africa’s 
history and the impact of apartheid in creating imbalances in development, where 
rural areas continue to suffer the impacts of extreme weather conditions because of 
their vulnerability. For example, Zuma did not make any specific reference about 
communities in South Africa that experience health issues because their homes are 
close to factories that release toxins into the air or water. His emphasis focused on 
policy. 
Zuma placed great emphasis to ensuring that the developing world are on the 
receiving end of fair and balance outcomes by often telling his audiences that a 
legally binding agreement is needed. This tactic underscores that South Africa is 
willing to commit to GHG target reductions but on the condition that all other parties 
are on board. 
This dissertation discussed CBDR at length when unpacking Zuma’s master 
narrative, however, it must be pointed out that his idea of justice is correlated to the 
concept. Zuma’s rhetoric is clear that justice can be served if countries that were 
previously responsible for higher GHG emissions take responsibility for their actions 
by “taking the lead” as he often puts to address climate change. He re-iterates the 
point by arguing that for many years that these concepts were central to 
negotiations.  
These are multilateralism, environmental integrity, common but differentiated 
responsibility and respective capabilities, equity and honouring of all 
international commitments and undertakings made in the climate change 
process. I, therefore, encourage the parties to apply these principles in the 
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discussions and ensure that the final outcome remains faithful to these 
principles. (Appendix 6) 
Zuma also related to fairness and balance by asking countries to put their national 
agendas aside when negotiating climate change agreements. He urged countries to 
do this “no matter how difficult this may be” despite the fact this has been one of the 
major factors that cause blockages in these types of talks. 
The difficulty with putting national agendas aside has been that countries have 
different understanding of fairness or equity to global climate change as seen during 
many of the COPs. The debate has been around the increasing emissions by the 
developing countries. On the other hand, developing countries feel that developed 
countries generally have done little to implement their previous voluntary reduction 
commitments. There is no global police to monitor policies nor can one country be 
prevented from reaping the benefits of another country’s effort to limit climate change 
effects (Cazorla & Toman, 2000). 
Zuma also related to fairness by arguing that developing countries must be allowed a 
developmental space. The president linked that with the concept of distribution by 
asking that “funding, technology transfers, mechanisms and networks and capacity 
building for real and tangible adaptation actions must be established. This will give 







5.5 Climate change and SA leaders: 
Former South African Presidents Mandela, Mbeki and Kgalema Motlanthe did not 
attend any COPs, making Zuma the first president to do so in 2009 when he 
attended the Copenhagen talks, COP15, according to DIRCO. Zuma subsequently 
attended COP16 in Mexico, a year before South Africa played host. Zuma has since 
not attended a COP. 
The Copenhagen talks were set up to be a decisive one, in that many hoped for a 
binding international agreement. Hopes were raised by renewed US engagements 
under the Obama administration. Several other countries make national statements 
of increased commitments. However, the talks were marred by failure to agree on 
the burden of action. There were several procedural road blocks but outright failure 
was avoided. Twenty eight countries conducted last minute negotiations which lead 
to a political deal at the final hours (Dessler & Parson, 2010). 
Best to the researcher’s knowledge there were no dedicated speeches by Mandela 
on climate change. Mbeki, in 2007, was very clear in his speech to the 62nd United 
Nations General Assembly that action on climate change would depend on countries’ 
circumstances. Mbeki spoke mainly on how the consequences of climate change, 
mainly extreme weather patterns severely hindering the common efforts to reach the 
MDGs.  
The speech made the country’s position clear: There must be climate equity and the 
SA’s right to develop must stay a priority. Similarly to the current leadership, Mbeki in 




 Mbeki’s strong statements, although more general, were also noted when he said in 
Parliament that “The South African Government understands the urgency of action, 
and that the costs of doing nothing about climate change far outweigh those of taking 
concrete measures” (Mbeki, 2007). 
South Africa hosted the World Summit for Sustainable Development in 2002 ten 
years after the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. The Rio Summit resulted in a number of 
landmark agreements that sought to address stopping and where possible reversing 
damage done to the environmental and addressing poverty and inequality. According 
to Mbeki (2007) Agenda 21 was central for developing a framework for sustainable 
development. In his address at the Summit, Mbeki used terms such as “ecological 
degradation” and “social and economic development with environmental protection”, 
the rhetoric at the time did not use the term climate change as prominently as it’s 
being used in recent times. 
Mbeki also referred to South Africa’s history and the impact that apartheid had on 
economic development for the majority of the country:  
Having emerged from more than three centuries of colonialism and apartheid, 
we inherited two inter-linked economies that we characterise as the First and 
Second economies. The two economies - one developed and globally 
connected and another localised and informal, display many features of a 
global system of apartheid. As South Africans, we sought to strengthen the 
First economy and use it as a base to transfer resources to strengthen and 
modernise the Second economy and thus embark on the process to change 
the lives of those who subsist in this Second economy (Mbeki, 2007). 
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Mbeki too spoke on behalf of developing nations when he highlighted that 
developing countries, especially those in Africa, “do not have the material base from 
which to address and attain the MDGs on their own”. He called for assistance with 
financial aid as well as “investment, trade, technology transfers and human resource 
development to these poor countries if we are to achieve the development goals and 
successfully adapt to the devastating impacts of climate change” (Mbeki, 2007). 
Mbeki also stressed that climate change policies must be “fair, effective, flexible and 
inclusive climate regime under the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol”. On the point of 
CBDR Mbeki also saw the need for countries’ individual circumstances to be 
considered. In his 2007 address at the UN he said, “Though we have different 
responsibilities, and developed countries clearly have to take the lead, we all have a 
common duty to do more and act within our respective capabilities and in 
accordance with our national circumstances” (Mbeki, 2007).  
While there were other ministers present at COP17, the researcher focuses on two 
key ministers because of the positions they occupied. Minister Nkoana-Mashabane 
was the President of the COP and her rhetoric oscillated between specifics of how 
the negotiation process needed to evolve with major emphasis on the importance of 
renewing the Kyoto protocol. 
The balance between being a minister in an African country and the COP president 
was evident in her rhetoric, when Nkoana-Mashabane spoke about how the “climate 
change negotiation process is still recovering from the serious setbacks it has 
suffered over the years and a trust deficit needs to be overcome” (Nkoana-




Nkoana-Mashabane had the challenging task of striking a balance between the talks 
itself and her being a key member of the South African government. South Africa’s 
climate change policy or key challenges faced as a result of climate change was, 
therefore, limited in her speeches.  
However, whether she was addressing the media or high level sessions, she too 
spoke fervently on the CBDR that should be accorded to developing and developed 
nations. Similarly to Zuma, she also called for funding for mitigation and adaptation 
for developing countries, especially African states. 
Nkoana-Mashabane also viewed climate change as a “practical manner” that 
required a “balanced, fair and credible outcome” that “must be directed by the 
principles that form the basis of UNFCCC climate change negotiation” (Nkoana-
Mashabane, 2011). 
She also acknowledged that Green Climate Fund in the Durban talks would be a 
crucial issue “especially since the developing countries clearly demand a prompt 
start for funding as it would unlock many other pressing issues and would allow them 
to reach their objectives in this regard” (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2011).  
In one of her speeches (Nkoana-Mashabane a, 2011) singled out her engagement 
with women making this the second time that special attention was given to any 
vulnerable group that suffers that effects of climate change, the first was a reference 





Minister Molewa’s rhetoric had more flexibility to draw attention to the South Africa, 
while acknowledging that climate change negotiation are “extremely complex, highly 
political and sometimes conflicting set of social, economic and environmental 
development issues” (Molewa, 2011). 
While she focused on the concepts of funding and CBDR, she was vocal about SA 
climate change policy in relation to the country’s recognition that “in the medium-
term, some of the options with the biggest mitigation potential include the shifting to 
lower-carbon electricity generation options” (Molewa A, 2011). 
However, similarly to the president Molewa placed more emphasis on the New 
Growth Path. She spoke about “Government recently signed a Green Economy 
Accord which commits signatories to a partnership to build and grow the green 
economy. The Accord notes that up to 300 000 jobs are possible within a decade if 
South” (Molewa, 2011). 
Molewa’s rhetoric kept the dialogue closer to home when she argued that if climate 
change was left unattended addressed, it could compromise that impact on 
“developmental gains and the progress made by South Africa, the Southern African 






Chapter six: Discussion 
The examination of the White Paper explains SA’s roadmap to address climate 
change but a study of Zuma’s rhetoric gives us an understanding of how the 
leadership of this country views climate change in relation to the realities facing their 
people.  
It is evident that SA’s history of inequality informed Zuma’s rhetoric. He positioned 
SA on the side of the divide that is disadvantaged. While he acknowledged the 
country’s political and economic standing as compared to his African counterparts, 
Zuma’s rhetorical approach to climate change negotiations appear to be conditional. 
The findings show that his rhetoric was mainly informed by the country’s economic 
development and that even global policies need to factor this in for the entire 
developing world. 
For example, during the Copenhagen talks, the president went to the extent of 
committing that “South Africa for example will be able to reduce emissions by 34% 
below ‘business as usual’ levels by 2020 and by 42% by 2025” with the condition 
that the country receives “financial and technological support from developed 
countries”.  
Given that it is challenging to balance rhetorical idealism and policy practicalities, 
civil society responded to this goal with scepticism and considered Zuma’s target to 
be quite unrealistic (Death, 2011).  South Africa was also on the receiving end of 
criticism from other African civil society organisations for breaking the “collective 
responsibility”. Another research paper indicated that SA’s unilateral decision to 
commit to this target was also met with apprehension and contributed, in a way, to 
the existing disunity in Africa and as well as with the G77 + China (PANA, 2008).   
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Despite Zuma referring to “we” when he spoke about Africa, as a means to be 
inclusive, his rhetoric on justice is not compelling when it comes to climate change 
negotiations and Africa. With the developed world and now the top echelon of the 
developing world having more bargaining power during climate talks, it would be 
expected that the leader of Africa’s powerhouse to be more inclined to speak with a 
unified voice.   
He positioned Africa within the developing world so as to not alienate the rest of the 
nations belonging to this group. In this way he seemingly strengthen his arguments 
that poorer countries across the world should be able to negotiate climate 
agreements that work for them. 
An interesting point of contention is that Zuma spoke about the developing world with 
emphasis largely placed on Africa. He hardly refers to China, India, Brazil and 
Russia, also all developing nations and members of the BRICS coalition. The BRICS 
is considered to be the new “building blocks of the global economy” and have all 
played a significant role in the G20 shaping the economic policy and financial 
stability of the globe (Prasad, 2013). 
The challenge Zuma possibly faced in referring to China and India could be that 
these two developing nations’ growth has sprouted tremendously. China has 
overtaken the US as largest emitter of climate change (Giddens, 2007) which is an 
indication of both the country’s economic growth and heavy dependence on coal for 
energy. China without making any commitment to the Kyoto protocol has called for 
fairness and equality by making developed countries responsible for mitigation 
(Stalley, 2013). This of course is a thorny issue that made developed nations such 
as the US and Canada not commit to legally binding agreements.  
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Zuma’s rhetorical approach to China would require a level of caution as the Asian 
powerhouse assumes a leadership role in developing countries and in the G77 
(Kasa, Gullberg & Heggelund, 2008). Researchers describe China as “the most 
vocal advocates” of CBDR who urge other developing countries, such as South 
Africa, to rally on issues of fairness and equity (Stalley, 2013).  
China, despite its growing emissions levels also advocates for the principle of CBDR. 
And like SA, China uses this principle to frame climate change as a “North-South 
issue” (Stalley 2013).  
This CBDR principle which SA, China and other developing nations have 
emphasised constantly resulted in stalemate in climate change negotiations. One of 
the main reasons is that the different nations have conflicting interpretations of the 
CBDR principle (Harris & Symons 2013).  
Pauw & et al (2014) have questioned that if some of the developing nations are now 
the largest emitters, should a “critical reconsideration of the conceptualisation and 
implementation of CBDR” not be considered and note the lack of progress made in 
this area. 
Like the Chinese economy, South Africa’s economy is energy-intensive due to their 
dependence on coal as indicated by Zuma. However, Koketso (2012) noted that in 
the past SA’s contributions were minimal compared to emissions from industrialised 
nations. He argued that in order for South Africa to tend to its socio-economic 
challenges, the country would need a steady economy without restrictions.  
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Koketso (2012) concurred with Zuma’s argument that it would be “grossly unfair to 
expect South Africa to abandon its current economic drive while other countries have 
benefited from decades of development based on fossil fuels” (Appendix ). 
Despite the US and other developed nations vehemently arguing against CBDR 
(Vint, 2012) Zuma’ argument is supported by research which indicated the merit in 
using CBDR to differentiate between the developing and developed world. The 
report showed that “65 nations emissions paths currently seem to be within the 
climate-friendly range are poor developing countries” (German Advisory Council on 
Global Change, 2009). 
Zuma used rhetoric that places more emphasis on how climate change impacts 
South Africa rather than the country’s contribution to global emissions. For example, 
Zuma implied that South Africa’s priority to achieve “economic transformation is 
therefore an integral part of our quest for a sustainable economy that responds to the 
impact of climate change”. On the occasion he did mention South Africa’s emissions 
while simultaneously talking about the country’s vulnerability. 
Stern (2007) advocated that development policy and process must make room for 
the inclusion of adaptation measures. Considering this a first step, Stern (2007) 
argued that this can be achieved by first pivotal step towards effective adaptation. 
While Zuma has paid little attention to budgets in his speeches he has focused on 
overarching economic policies. 
Mbeki and Zuma’s rhetoric on this subject is consistent with the ruling party who 
says that environmental issues have been considered in various policies and 
programmes since 1994. The ANC, acknowledging the country’s history promote 
“transformative environmentalism” based on “sustainable development” to bring 
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about social and economic justice. Nkoana-Mashabane and Molewa despite playing 
different roles during COP17 used rhetoric that was aligned to the current and past 
president, indicating the consistency in South Africa’s messages about climate 
change. 
Zuma’s rhetoric on climate change, like his predecessor, mainly focused on the 
economy. He bolstered his arguments by positioning SA as a developing country 
with urgent needs for economic growth. Given that climate change is a global 
challenge, South Africans would need a president to state his position. When leaders 
are silent on keys issues it does not go unnoticed. Zuma’s stance on climate change 
allows for possible engagement with civil society or business and labour who he 
sees as necessary allies in this dilemma. 
Sheckels (2010) asserted that Mandela, especially towards the end of his term, did 
not come across as too confident when he spoke about policies. It would appear that 
Zuma in his climate change speeches exuded confidence to an extent by repeatedly 
referring to his economic growth path policy. 
6.1 Limitations of the study 
Zuma’s speeches were sourced from the COPs which in its nature is highly political. 
This selection means that one’s understanding of how Zuma talks about climate 
change to civil societies or ordinary South Africans were limited. The time period for 
this study occurs before and during South Africa’s hosting of the Durban talks. 
Therefore the researcher is unable to ascertain if there was a shift in Zuma’s 




The purposive sampling means that generalisations on Zuma’s rhetoric on other 
topics cannot be made. This is unfortunate because South African presidential 
rhetoric studies are slim. This dissertation did not focus on other ministers speaking 
at COP17, such as the Ministers of Energy and Economic Development. Their 
rhetoric could have also contributed to a broader understanding of the subject at a 
national government level. 
The word constraints of this dissertation did not allow for a secondary analysis on 
media coverage’s of the speeches. Analysing some of the media content could help 
contextualize and explain how media and the public respond or react to Zuma’s and 
government’s communication.  
Understanding the reactions would help communicators to revise messages to 
include not only important values but practical information embedded in policy to 
help citizens become empowered in responding to climate change on a personal and 
community level. It can also identify the public’s concerns and areas which they 










Chapter seven: Conclusion 
The aim of this dissertation was to examine presidential rhetoric on climate change 
in South Africa by analysing Zuma’s speeches during COP17. The world spotlight 
was on South Africa as this was the first time the country hosted a COP. Zuma was 
also the first South African president to attend a COP. It was on this basis that the 
researcher felt compelled to analyse his climate change rhetoric as opposed to 
speeches made by his predecessors. 
South African presidents have spoken extensively about subjects such as HIV/AIDs, 
poverty and unemployment, unlike climate change. Therefore, this thesis has aided 
in making a contribution to the understanding of government climate change rhetoric 
in SA. In doing so it has also contributed to the limited but growing African 
presidential rhetoric studies.  
It is well established that Africa with its minimal contributions to CO2 emissions is 
most susceptible to the effects of climate change. It is also common knowledge that 
South Africa finds itself in a dubious position in that it is the largest contributor of 
CO2 emissions but it also faces developmental challenges including inequality and 
poverty which remain a massive challenge for the majority of its people. 
By identifying Zuma’s master narratives on climate change, we are now in a position 
to understand how SA views the challenge; who it considers responsible, how it 
views itself as contributing to the problem and what can be done. 
Zuma’s rhetoric on climate change indicated that SA’s priority is economic 
development and this will not be compromised by climate change policy which halts 
growth in developing nations. 
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Zuma was clear that CBDR must remain the cornerstone of climate change policy, if 
fairness, balance and equity are to be realised. He stood by this argument despite 
growing GHG emissions from some of the developing nations. 
One of the aims of the study was to assist communicators in the rhetorical strategy 
on climate change. This thesis identified that SA needs to be more clear on how 
exactly it contributes to climate change, it would help without dwelling too much in 
the past to explain what has been done and how the current dispensation has 
contributed to the problem. Zuma only touches on this point very briefly. 
SA has been criticised for not always prioritising the interest of other African nations 
in climate change negotiations and to an extent this argument in terms of rhetoric is 
an important one. When Zuma spoke about Africa, he specifically mentioned 
examples of extreme weather conditions on the continent or how Africa’s 
developmental needs should not be compromised in climate change policy. That 
Africa faces injustice because it does not necessarily have the resources to enjoy 
commanding positions at these talks, is not an issue he raises. Zuma’s rhetoric is 
similar to that of other leaders in that climate change now remains more an 
economic issue rather than an environmental one. 
Future research into this topic is important because it can contribute to presidential 
rhetoric in Africa.  
Analysis of climate change rhetoric in other areas such as business and labour and 
NGOs could also contribute to a further understanding of how climate change is 
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Date: 28 November 2011 
 
Address by His Excellency President Jacob Zuma at the Cities and Local Government 
Convention on the margins of the UNFCC Climate Change Conference, Durban 
02 December 2011 
Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC: Ms Christiana Figueres;   
The Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Minister Richard Baloyi;   
KZN Premier, Dr Zweli Mkhize, 
Chairperson of SALGA,  
Councillor Thabo Manyoni;  
Mayor of eThekwini Municipality, Councillor James Nxumalo;   
The President of Local Governments for Sustainability and Deputy Mayor of Vancouver, 
Canada, Councillor David Cadman;   
Governors, Mayors and Councillors, 
Distinguished guests; 
Good morning to you all! 
Thank you for inviting us to this Local Government and Cities Convention. 
This is an important gathering as it focuses primarily on the agenda of the Local 
Governments from the Global South, who have a lot to contribute to the UN climate change 
response process.  
  
Local Government is the sphere of government that is the closest to the people. It is directly 
responsible for the implementation of climate change response programmes. 
We are therefore pleased that this convention is taking place, as this dialogue among 
municipalities is very important. 
Ladies and gentlemen, 
As you are aware we are meeting in the middle of the United Nations climate change talks, 
known popularly as COP 17. 
Negotiators are discussing how to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to secure a relatively 
safe future for all of humanity.  
In the African context, they must help us strike a balance between ensuring that climate 
change does not reach dangerous levels on the one hand, and the need to grow our 
economies to eradicate poverty on the other hand. 
The convention is proceeding well. The discussions are continuing as planned in an 
environment that is conducive to constructive engagement. 
Parties still have divergent views on the shape of the final outcome. 
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However, there is a general understanding that parties should positively and decisively 
resolve the question of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, which commits 
developed countries to cut their emissions of greenhouse gases. 
The first Kyoto commitment period expires at the end of 2012. 
Parties must also reach agreement on the legal nature of a future climate change system. 
Generally, Parties agree that Durban should operationalise the Cancun agreements. This 
includes the establishment of the Adaptation Committee, the Technology Mechanism, the 
transparency rules on mitigation and support. 
For Durban to be regarded as a resounding success, especially for developing countries, the 
Green Climate Fund that was agreed to in Cancun must be operationalised. 
This must be done by adopting the report of the Transitional Committee and through an early 
launch of the fund. 
The Co-chair of the Transitional Committee, South African Minister in the Presidency, Mr 
Trevor Manuel, presented the report of the Committee to the Parties on Wednesday, 30 
November. 
It is worth noting that regardless of the good work done by the Transitional Committee, the 
sources of long-term finance are not yet clearly defined. 
For the initial capitalisation of the fund to be realised in Durban, the high level segment that 
is due to start next week will have to provide the political will, which should translate into 
financial pledges. 
Many developing countries are hopeful that the early launch of the fund will allow for both 
their adaptation and mitigation needs to be met. 
I must point out that the mood of the negotiations thus far indicates that we should remain 
optimistic of achieving a successful outcome. 
There is a general consensus that the effects of climate change are affecting all of us, 
although differently, and that action on mitigating these effects can no longer be delayed.  
We trust that this realisation will help us reach the compromises we need to take this 
process forward and help us live up to the responsibility we have towards our people. 
Ladies and gentlemen, 
As an African country, South Africa wants the Durban outcome to be pro-poor, pragmatic 
and in line with the African development agenda. 
We feel strongly the climate change regime must not jeopardise the economic growth and 
poverty eradication priorities of developing countries. 
We are keen to challenge the notion that there is a trade-off to be made between faster 
economic growth and the preservation of our environment. 
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We must prove that faster economic growth can be achieved alongside the sustainable 
management of our natural resources. 
That is the route we are following in South Africa, through investing in green economy 
interventions that will help us save the future while creating decent work. 
Ladies and gentlemen, 
We look to local government to contribute to shaping the outcome of Durban as the sphere 
that has to respond immediately to the impact of climate change. 
Given the pivotal role of local government, it is of concern that some local authorities in 
Africa and the developing South believe that the dominant features of the current climate 
change response debate are not relevant to their context. 
This means that the climate change regime must be visibly in touch with the general 
conditions of poverty that most local authorities in the developing world operate under, for it 
to be relevant to the people of the South. 
The high levels of poverty increases the vulnerability of most municipalities, and makes it 
impossible for them to respond adequately to the impact of climate change. 
Due to limited resources they often have to choose between adaptation - responding to the 
impacts of climate change and mitigation, reducing the emission of greenhouse gases that 
cause climate change. 
In this regard, we urge the developed world to take the constraints of Africa and other 
developing countries seriously when considering Climate Change response measures, and 
in particular adaptation measures. 
We reiterate the position that efforts by developing countries to contribute to the mitigation of 
green house gas emissions should be supported by richer nations through the provision of 
technology, financing and capacity building. 
Ladies and gentlemen, 
Given that local government is the first port of call for people in distress during periods of 
disasters, disaster management mechanisms must be drastically enhanced in all 
municipalities as a matter of urgency. 
In our country we have had our fair share of extreme weather which has caused destruction 
and mayhem. Science tells us that we are bound to experience more of these severe 
occurrences. 
We experienced unprecedented heavy rains and flooding during December 2010 and 
January 2011.  
Thirty four municipalities that are located in eight of the nine country’s provinces were the 
worst affected.   We also suffered massive damage to 27 461 settlements. 
The impact on education, transport, agriculture, and health infrastructure was estimated at 
almost R4 billion.  
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This led to the affected areas being declared national disaster areas. 
As a result, currently all the 278 municipalities in the country are mainstreaming climate 
change responses in all their local planning processes and Integrated Development Plans. 
This local government convention will hopefully enable municipalities to compare best 
practices with these response mechanisms. 
Municipalities in the developing world must not wait for surprise flooding, extreme drought or 
fires. 
We need to start investing today in a safer tomorrow, by prioritizing the establishment of 
disaster management structures across all spheres of government. 
In our country, 30 municipalities already have disaster management centres and work is 
ongoing to create others given the challenge we face. 
This Cities and Local Government Convention should indeed help in fostering such 
cooperation and the sharing of expertise. 
Ladies and gentlemen, 
Let me reiterate how humbled we are by the confidence shown in our country by the United 
Nations through entrusting us with the responsibility of hosting the COP 17/CMP7 
conference. 
Africa, the G77 plus China and the BASIC countries – Brazil, South Africa, India and China – 
will continue working with other regions to ensure a successful outcome. 
We must strive for a balanced, fair and credible outcome that can pass any test of 
environmental integrity. 
We must work towards an inclusive, fair and effective climate change deal which is 
favourable to both the developed and developing countries. 
So far, success is in sight. 
We trust that you will have fruitful deliberations as you work to make local government more 
responsive and resilient to climate change. 
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Your Excellency the President of the Republic of Chad and Chairperson of the Economic 
Community of Central African States, 
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Excellencies Deputy President of the Republic of South Africa and Vice-President of the 
Republic of Angola, 
Honourable Ministers, 
Executive Secretary of SADC, 
Honourable Premier of KwaZulu-Natal province, 
Distinguished delegates of states parties, 
Ladies and gentlemen, 
 
It is my pleasure to welcome you all to South Africa and to the city of Durban in the beautiful 
province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). 
 
You are meeting in a part of South Africa known for its rich history of bravery and military 
conquest, displayed in the early years of our history, under the reign of the legendary King 
Shaka, after whom the airport you landed at, is named. 
 
The KZN province is also known for its scenic beauty, warm and friendly people, diverse and 
colourful culture as well as a stretch of golden beaches. 
 
We are welcoming you to a province which was home to some of the greatest leaders, our 
country’s first Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Chief Albert Luthuli and also at some point, the 
legendary Mahatma Gandhi. 
 
Both were distinguished fighters for freedom, justice and human rights for all. 
 
This is also the city and province in which the founding President of a free and democratic 
South Africa, our icon, President Nelson Mandela, cast his vote for the first time on 27 April 
1994, launching a new era of freedom and democracy in our country. 
 
We are therefore truly honoured to host in this province and country, the 17th Conference of 
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, known commonly 
as COP 17, and the 7th Conference of Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol, known as CMP7. 
 
We thank the United Nations for showing confidence in Africa’s ability to host this meeting 





I have mentioned some of the outstanding leaders who taught us the power of reaching out 
to people who think differently from ourselves, in order to find solutions to complex political 
problems. 
 
That is the spirit that should prevail in COP17/CMP7. 
 





This meeting is taking place because climate change poses serious risks for humanity, 
especially in the developing world. Climate change can no longer be treated as just an 




Various regions of the world have different views on the issue, simply because they are 
affected differently by climate change. However, for most people in the developing world and 
Africa, climate change is a matter of life and death. We are always reminded by the leaders 
of small island states that climate change threatens their very existence.  
 
As the sea level rises, it threatens to wipe them off the face of the earth.  
 
Recently the island nation of Kiribati became the first country to declare that global warming 
is rendering its territory uninhabitable. They have asked for help to evacuate the population. 
 
Africa’s vulnerability does not only stem from climate change impacts such as the rise in the 
sea level, severe droughts and floods. Africa is more vulnerable because of poverty which 
limits the ability of most African nations to cope with the impact of climate change. 
 
Agricultural output in many African countries is expected to decrease by as much as 50% by 
the year 2050, which will cause serious food shortages.  
 
In some practical examples of impact, scarce grazing land is causing conflict in the Sudan, 
amongst peoples that have previously lived in peace for centuries. 
 
Severe drought in Somalia is exacerbating an already volatile region causing displacement 
of populations and increasing refugee communities in Kenya. 
 
In the Americas, we have also witnessed the frequency of intense hurricanes on the Gulf 
Coast from which the communities of New Orleans have yet to fully recover, five years after 
Hurricane Katrina. 
 
In our own country, we have experienced unusual and severe flooding in coastal areas in 
recent times, impacting on people directly as they lose their homes, jobs and livelihoods. 
 
Given the urgency, states parties should strive to find solutions here in Durban. 
 
Negotiators will be building on the good work done in Cancun, Mexico at COP16/CMP6.  
The message we wish to emphasise to negotiators is simple. 
 
The expectation is that you must work towards an outcome that is balanced, fair and 
credible. 
 
You have before you the responsibility to re-affirm the multilateral rules-based system 
anchored by the Kyoto Protocol and to provide the funding needed to address impacts of 
climate change through activating the Green Climate Fund. 
 
Another key issue on the table is the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol 
and reaching agreement on the legal nature of a future climate change system. 
 
As this Conference of the Parties is taking place in Africa, adaptation is a key priority, 
particularly for small island states, least developed countries and Africa. 
 
We also feel strongly that as an African Conference of the Parties, the COP 17 outcome 
must recognise that solving the climate problem cannot be separated from the struggle to 
eradicate poverty. 
 
Informed by this view, as a responsible global citizen, South Africa is contributing its fair 




At COP 15 in Copenhagen, we announced our commitment to reduce carbon emissions by 
34% in 2020 and by 42% in 2025, with support from developed countries with regards to 
finance, technology and capacity-building. 
 
We have gone some way towards implementing this undertaking. 
 
Our New Growth Path framework includes comprehensive green economy interventions 
including an ambitious focus on renewable energy and the promotion of green industries. 
 
Early this month we concluded a landmark Green Economy Social Accord, signed by 
government, the trade union movement and the business community, committing all of us to 
achieve 300 000 green jobs by 2020. 
 
The Accord showcases one of the greatest South African strengths, which is social dialogue 
and partnerships. 
 
The green economy will create new opportunities for enterprise development, job creation 
and the renewal of commercial and residential environments the world over. 
 
There are also significant opportunities for the development of a green economy in Southern 
Africa and which could also be extended to other parts of the Continent. 
 
In this regard, the Republic of South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo recently 
signed an Agreement with respect to the Grand Inga Hydro Electricity Project for the 
construction of a dam that will provide electricity to more than half of Africa’s population. 
 
The plant is estimated to generate about 40 000 megawatts, which is over one third of the 
total electricity produced in Africa today. 
 
We are also working to generate hydro and wind energy sources from cooperation with the 
Kingdom of Lesotho through Phase 2 of the Lesotho Highland Water Project, and are 
working on other renewable energy projects with Mozambique. 
Change and solutions are always possible. 
 
In these talks, States parties will need to look beyond their national interests to find a global 





We have come a long way since Copenhagen and Cancun. Durban must take us many 
steps forward towards a solution that saves tomorrow today. 
 
Let me once again extend a warm welcome on behalf of the government and people of the 
Republic of South Africa. 
  
It is my honour and privilege to declare COP17 and the seventh meeting of parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol open. 
 
I look forward to meeting with you again on the 6th of December, when we open the high 
level segment. 
 
I wish you well with your deliberations. 
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Ministers and Deputy Ministers; 
CEOs of various organizations, local and international; 
Members of the Business fraternity; 
Esteemed guests; 




We appreciate this opportunity to meet with the business sector during this 17th Session of 
the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (COP17) serving as the seventh meeting of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
The theme of COP 17,Working Together: Saving Tomorrow Today reminds us that it is not 
only governments that have a responsibility to build a sustainable future. The business 
sector has a key role to play too, alongside other key sectors of society. 
 
Your interest in these climate change talks as business indicates your understanding that 
climate change is more than just an environmental issue. It is about the continued existence 
of the human species in harmony with its environment in a sustainable manner. 
 
Climate change is already having a serious impact on Africa and many parts of the world. 
 
Changing weather patterns are affecting the environment, health, natural resources, shelter, 
infrastructure such as roads, bridges or dams, and even food production. 
 
The negotiations are a party-driven process. South Africa, as COP President represented by 
our Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, is playing an enabling role for 
parties to find agreement on the salient issues of climate change.  
 
As South Africa, we seek a global regime that ensures that climate change does not reach 
dangerous levels, while recognising that the priority for developing countries is to address 
poverty and socio-economic development. 
 
The talks have to produce a multilateral climate change regime that is fair, credible, 
balanced, inclusive and effective. 
 
Thus far, talks are going well. Parties still differ on a number of issues. We think this is 
normal especially during the first week of the conference, ahead of the start of the high level 
segment next week. 
 




The climate change talks are taking place against the background of yet another economic 
crisis in the developed world, which is likely to impact on most parts of the globe. 
 
The situation in some parts of Europe is serious and the rest of the globe will feel the impact, 
more so the developing world. 
 
The economic crisis occurs during a period when the world is already facing rising food and 
fuel prices, extreme and unusual weather conditions due to climate change, energy 
insecurity, poverty, youth unemployment, and continued economic volatility. 
 
The situation calls for us to find economic solutions that attend to the needs of our planet.  
 
New sources of growth and innovation, and new technologies and models for driving 
investment are urgently needed to deliver long-term prosperity in a stable, sustainable and 
inclusive way. 
 
It is in this context that we promote a green economy and green growth.   
 
A Green Economy is one in which business processes are configured or reconfigured to 
deliver better returns on natural, human and economic capital investments, while at the 
same time reducing greenhouse gas emissions, extracting and using fewer natural 
resources, creating less waste and reducing social disparities.  
 
Thus, a Green Economy grows by reducing rather than increasing resource consumption. 
 
We have committed ourselves to our people as a government to work towards an inclusive, 
green, and sustainable growth.  
 
The inclusive nature of the growth is a key focus in our country as we come from a history of 
political and economic exclusion of the majority of the population during the pre-1994 period 
of apartheid and colonial oppression. 
 
New ways of doing things, like promoting sustainable development and green growth 
provide an opportunity for South Africa to expand its push towards an inclusive growth and 
an economy that includes and caters for the needs of all of our people.  
 
Meaningful economic transformation is therefore an integral part of our quest for a 
sustainable economy that responds to the impact of climate change.  
 
We emphasise this because developing green economies is not just about eco-efficiency but 
also about equity.  
 
Experience shows that growth does not in itself necessarily overcome exclusion and 
marginalization.  
 
For as long as people lack adequate education and healthcare, infrastructure, access to 
land, capital, finance and market institutions, they simply cannot take advantage of growth, 
green or not.  
 
They are trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty. Instead of broad development, the benefits of 
growth end up captured by a relatively small number of people.  
 




We define it as growth that ensures adequate incomes to workers to address the needs of 
their families. This puts decent work at the centre of our efforts to build a more inclusive 
green economy. 
 
We refer to growth that promotes rural development and connects the rural population to the 
mainstream economy. 
 
We refer to growth that promotes strong local economic empowerment, so that our people 
see tangible benefits in the expansion of goods and services. In the case of South Africa, it 
means ensuring the economic empowerment of the black majority. 
 
We refer to growth that addresses gender inequalities, so that women can find real 
opportunities in the economy.  
 
Inclusive and sustainable growth also refers to growth that draws in young people so that we 
do not have a young generation without hope and opportunity.  
 
It also refers to growth that is combined with respect for basic rights, such as health, safety 
and trade union rights in the workplace. 
 
Sustainable green growth must also include improved access to quality education and skills. 
It must also bridge the digital divide so that the children of the poor can also gain access to 
the information and communication technology skills that are so crucial in the modern 
economy.  
 
We are addressing the need for balanced, green and inclusive growth through our 
government’s New Growth Path framework which places employment at the centre of our 
efforts. 
 
For the African continent, this opportunity of driving green and inclusive growth requires that 
we leapfrog from being just a producer of raw materials.  
Africa has to build dynamic and competitive manufacturing sectors that do not just export 
raw materials but which process the minerals and agricultural products into consumer goods. 
 
Today we invite you to partner with South Africa and Africa on the road towards inclusive, 
shared, sustainable and greener growth. 
 
The South African Government is already implementing strategies towards cleaner 
technology and transition towards a low carbon future, guided by our recently adopted 
National Climate Change Response Policy.  
 
Having said this, we are very mindful of the fact that South Africa finds itself in a situation in 
which it is both a high emitter of greenhouse gases, as well as a country extremely 
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.  
 
We are the largest producer of electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa, generating 90% of our 
electricity from coal. 
 
As a responsible global citizen, we remain fully committed to contribute our fair share to the 
global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
However, given our developmental challenges, we will continue the use of fossil fuels in the 




It was with that visionary approach in mind that on the eve of the Climate Change Summit 
held in Copenhagen, we announced our commitment to reduce our carbon emissions by 
34% by 2020 and by 42% by 2025.  
 
This was to be done in the context of a comprehensive, fair and effective legal binding 
multilateral agreement that delivers financial and technology support for our action.  
 
However we are not waiting for an agreement in Durban before achieving green, sustainable 
and inclusive growth. 
 
We are forging ahead with our programme of greening the economy to improve the 
economic, social and environmental resilience of the country in the face of climate change.  
 
Africa and many developing countries boast most exciting opportunities for green growth, by 
virtue of their largely abundant natural resources.  
There are many initiatives that we can pursue together to protect the future, while not 
destroying industries and jobs. 
 
With the development of wind, solar and other renewable energy technologies, energy 
efficiency and even electric vehicles, we are now witnessing the growth of new green 
industries. 
 
There are vast opportunities for investments in the fields of renewable energy, marine 
aquaculture development, wildlife management, waste services as well as ecosystem 
rehabilitation programmes to name just a few.  
 
We are promoting investments in all these sectors. 
 
We have an ambitious renewable energy plan. We will soon announce the results of the 
bidding process for the first 3.725 megawatts of green energy to be procured under our 
Renewable Energy Flagship Programme over the next few years.  
 
 
Over the next twenty years we plan to scale this up to at least 18 Gigawatts, to account for 
42% of new capacity being commissioned.  
 
Last month, South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo signed an Agreement for 
the construction of the Grand Inga Dam that will provide electricity to more than half of 
Africa’s population.  
 
Ladies and gentlemen, 
 
As we noted, the biggest barriers to developing renewable energy in Africa to date are not 
technological, but financial. 
 
In that regard, South Africa has been hard at work in the development and design of 
financial instruments aligned to our national plans for green growth. 
During the course of COP 17 we will be launching a key initiative that could kick-start major 
development for renewable energy generation and industrial development. 
 
The South African Renewable Initiative (SARi) funding mechanism will help us unlock South 
Africa’s green growth potential through the funding of large-scale renewable developments.  
This will be achieved with the assistance of global partners – donors and Governments, who 




Renewable energy still costs more than non-renewable energy, which in South Africa is 
largely supplied by cheap, abundant coal supplies.  
 
It is estimated that the renewables’ targets indicated in our Integrated Resource Plan 2010 
would add an average incremental cost of around 660 million US dollars to South Africa’s 
annual electricity bill up to the year 2044.  
 
The SARi model will enable us to deal with the high cost  through low cost loans and other 
financial instruments combined with time limited pay-for-performance grants.  
Ladies and gentlemen, 
 
In promoting this new green, sustainable and inclusive growth focus, we are putting together 
some policy proposals that will impact on the business sector. These may include putting a 
price on carbon and other pollution or on the over-exploitation of a scarce resource through 
mechanisms such as taxes, natural resource charges or tradable permit systems.  We would 
also have enablers or incentives such as recognition for eco-labeling systems.  
 
These are some of the issues we will continue discussing with business in our social 
dialogue forums. Already we have an innovative Green Economy Accord that we signed with 
business and labour, indicating the seriousness with which we all regard the need to move 
towards a green economy. 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, 
 
It is vitally important for nations to come to an agreement at COP17 to ensure that emerging 
nations are not burdened by penalties that make them uncompetitive. 
 
We thank you for supporting the COP 17/CMP7 process. 
 
Let me reiterate that we see in the threat of climate change, an opportunity to develop our 
green, inclusive, sustainable and shared growth. 
 
This would be growth that provides jobs and which improves infrastructure, health, education 
and all basic services that our communities need to have an improved quality of life. 
We also see in the response to the threat of climate change, an opportunity for meaningful 
economic transformation that will create an inclusive economy to contribute to the building of 
a better life for all. 
 
We will be partnering with the business community as we move forward to this new 
trajectory. 
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Your Excellencies;  
Distinguished guests;  
 
Colleagues and friends,  
 
Let me start by welcoming you to the UNFCCC climate change conference, COP17, a 
gathering to decide the future of the planet as a whole.  
 
Our central challenges here are to balance the development needs of our people today 
against the imperatives for our common future.  
I am happy to have this opportunity to share with you our plans and actions towards a low-
carbon economy. 
 
Colleagues and friends, 
 
Historically, the South African economy was built on our mineral riches, starting with 
diamonds and gold and expanding into platinum, steel and a host of other metals.  
 
That economic foundation was in turn largely founded on low-cost energy from our abundant 
coal. As a result, today we have one of the most energy intensive economies in the world.  
 
The wealth beneath our soil shaped South Africa for both the good and the bad. It shaped 
the buildings and infrastructure around you, the lovely cities and the resorts.  
 
At the same time, it was not used to shape and improve the villages and townships on the 
outskirts of our towns and cities.  
 
Indeed, the apartheid system was largely designed to support mining by providing cheap 
labour and cheap electricity, as well as the logistics systems needed to get our mineral 
riches to foreign markets.  
 
Today, we know that our old growth path, with its premise of plentiful but high carbon-
emitting energy, comes at a big cost to the environment.  
 
We will now have to establish new kinds of production and find new ways to produce goods 
which will reduce both our economy’s use of energy and emissions from energy production.  
 
This will require a profound and far-reaching change in our economy, one that will affect us 
all.  
 
This transformation will provide openings for new investment, production and employment.  
The challenge is to find opportunities amidst the costs and risks. 
 
It is not a job just for government or business or labour alone. It is something we must work 
on together.  
 
For instance, bringing in new sources of electricity requires government to regulate the 
national grid. It needs business to invest and bring its technological and managerial 
expertise to the table. 
 
Labour will be required to support the necessary training and to help fund projects through 
investment from members’ retirement savings for instance.  
 
That kind of collaboration is the only way we can make a greener economy possible in 




Beyond the narrow economic needs of transformation, we must also ensure that everyone 
gets something out of the process.  
 
Above all, we must make sure that poor communities do not end up footing the bill, whether 
through job losses or high prices.  
 
That would indeed make the whole process not only inhumane but ultimately unsustainable.  
Dear friends and colleagues, 
 
Just over a year ago, South Africa adopted a new policy framework that pointed to the need 
for changes in our economy. Our New Growth Path focuses on achieving more inclusive as 
well as greener growth.  
 
To start with, it targets employment creation as the most important step toward shared 
growth in South Africa.  
 
We are encouraging more labour-intensive activities that can create employment 
opportunities on a mass scale. 
 
But our New Growth Path also addresses the emissions intensity of growth. Three of the 
most important areas for achieving that aim are renewable and nuclear energy, green 
transport and the built environment.  
 
They offer opportunities for investment and employment creation in an array of activities in 
the short and long run. 
 
In the very short run, we will get jobs from services associated with cleaning up the 
environment, especially recycling, cleaning public spaces, and controlling invasive species.  
 
Already we have public employment schemes creating tens of thousands of jobs in these 
areas.  
 
We are also rolling out the installation of solar water heating units that are creating jobs and 
bringing clean energy into the homes of people.  
 
A critical step in realising these opportunities for growth while reducing emissions was the 
adoption of our Integrated Resource Plan for electricity. 
It foresees that in the coming decades, at least a third of new electricity generation will come 
from renewable sources.  
 
We are developing regulatory frameworks and support systems to encourage the production 
of electricity as well as the new technologies required to meet this ambitious target.  
 
We have also created an important platform, the Presidential Infrastructure Co-ordinating 
Commission, which must ensure that the necessary investments in new electricity 
generation are aligned with our broader development strategy.  
 
This Commission is drawing on expertise from across our society to ensure adequate, 
efficient and productive investment in infrastructure.  
 
It provides a central instrument to achieve our aims around transforming the energy sector in 




In short, as these examples show, we as government have begun to implement the New 
Growth Path’s commitments, including around the green economy.  
 
But again, this is not just an issue for the state.  
 
For this reason, we have captured our commitments in an accord with organised business, 
labour and other representatives of civil society who come together under the auspices of 
the country’s National Economic Development and Labour Council or NEDLAC.  
 
The Accord is one of the most comprehensive social partnerships on the green economy 
anywhere in the world.  
 
It covers not only green investments but also our shared commitment to ensuring that the 
benefits of those investments are more broadly spread. 
  
Let me highlight some of the specific elements of the accord.  
 
First, government is committed to procuring almost 4 000 megawatts of renewable energy 
for the national grid by 2016.  
 
That is more than this beautiful coastal city of Durban uses in a year. It is equal to around a 
tenth of national generation today.  
 
Our electricity utility, Eskom, and business will also continue to work on technologies to 
further reduce emissions from coal-fired plants.  
 
The solar and wind energy industries have targeted the creation of at least 50 000 green 
jobs by 2020.  Government will also support the installation of one million solar water heating 
systems by 2014 to 2015.  
 
That will provide the basis for expanding local production of components and heating 
systems.  
 
Organised labour will work with us to help establish cooperatives to undertake installation 
and maintenance.   
 
More importantly, all the parties will promote the manufacturing and distribution of clean 
cooking stoves and heaters for the local and continental market.  
 
This is an often overlooked area of emissions, but it has enormous implications for the health 
of poor communities – which in South Africa are often shrouded in smoke in the winter.  
 
Moreover, it should help reduce the burdens of collecting wood and cooking that are usually 
borne mostly by women.  
 
Second, as the discussions at COP 17 underscore, financing is a critical component of any 
strategy to green our economies. We obviously need to tap into international sources.  
 
This will be achieved partially through our Industrial Development Corporation, which will 
provide up to R25 billion for investments in green economy activities over the next five years.  
 
In addition, business has committed to strengthening existing efforts by financial institutions 
to fund investments in the green economy. It will also actively pursue investment 




Organised labour will promote retirement fund investment in green investment vehicles that 
will create jobs and support our broader goals of greening the economy. 
 
Third, business has committed to improving the environmental performance of existing 
production facilities.  
 
It will develop benchmarks for energy efficiency by industry as well as company energy-
management plans. These plans will implement the National Energy Efficiency Strategy, 
which targets a reduction in energy intensity of at least 10% by 2015. 
 
Organised labour will establish joint workplace committees to discuss and implement energy 
efficiency plans.  
 
It will undertake a “lights-off after hours” campaign in buildings and workplaces and educate 
members on the importance of energy efficiency.   
 
Government will introduce regulations to phase out the bright light bulbs and replace them 
with energy efficient ones. 
 
Fourth, government will provide a supportive regulatory environment for the biofuels 
industry, including the finalisation of mandatory blending regulations and incentives.  
 
Finally, government will invest in mass-transport systems to reduce reliance on private cars. 
Initial steps have been taken on bus rapid transport and commuter rail.  
 
By 2014, the state-owned commuter rail company, PRASA, will invest R20 billion in new 
trains, most of which will be manufactured locally.  
 
Government will also review its rail investment programme in order to accelerate the shift of 
freight transport to rail from road.  
 
The state-owned transport enterprise, Transnet, will invest about R63 billion in the freight rail 
system over the next five years. For its part, organised business will continue to promote 
greater use of rail freight by companies. 
 
Our Green Economy Accord also includes a strong commitment to ensuring that the benefits 
of the activities reach young people and those historically excluded from our formal 
economy.  
 
In particular, government and business have set a target of 80% youth amongst new 
employees in the manufacturing and installation of solar-water heating systems as well as 
government’s public works programmes to green the economy.  
Moreover, all the parties have agreed to a variety of measures and programmes to bring 
smaller and social enterprises into the green economy.  
 
As you can tell from the accord, the main opportunities will arise around renewable energy; 
biofuels; cleaner coal; more energy efficient technologies for production; and greening our 
buildings.  
 
We will, during COP 17, share our experiences while also learning from other nations who 
are going through similar economic transformation. 
 
Together as governments, business, labour and other sectors, we must form strong 




This World Economic Forum roundtable offers an opportunity to forge and strengthen such 
partnerships. 
 
I wish you well with the deliberations. 
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 Excellencies Heads of State and Government and leaders of delegations,  
Honourable UN Secretary General Mr Ban Ki‐moon,  
Ministers and Deputy Ministers,  
Distinguished negotiators,  
Ladies and gentlemen,  
It is a great honour and pleasure for me to welcome you to the High Level Segment  of COP 
17/CMP 7 in Durban, one of the holiday capitals of our country.  
The past week has seen extensive preparations, formal and informal meetings, planning, ne
gotiations and manoeuvring, to ensure that the success of the High‐Level Segment.   
I can safely assure my colleagues the Heads of State and Government as well as the UN Se
cretary General that your delegations were definitely not on holiday. They worked extremely 
hard to bring us to this level.  
As Parties, as we meet in Durban, we are agreed on the facts and impacts of climate change
 which are already evident all around us.  
We are agreed that this global challenge requires a global solution. However, different positi
ons still prevail on some critical points.  
However, it is important that there is common ground on the elements that will remain critical
 in reaching any agreement.   
These are multilateralism, environmental integrity, common but differentiated responsibility a
nd respective capabilities, equity, and honouring of all international commitments and undert
akings made in the climate change process.   
These principles have formed the basis of climate change negotiations over the years.   
Only by remaining true to them, through the Party‐
driven process, will we be able to achieve a credible response to this challenge. I therefore e
ncourage the parties to continue to apply these principles in the discussions and ensure that 
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the final outcome remains faithful to these principles. We need to show the world that Parties 
are ready to address the problems in a practical manner, and that they are willing to forgo 
the national interest at times, for 
the interest of humanity, no matter how difficult this may be.   
As we begin the high level segment, we need to re‐build trust and to re‐
assure one another of honest intent and commitment to find solutions for the problems caus
ed by climate change.  
By now all of us understand that Durban is a decisive moment for the future of the multilatera
l rules‐
based regime, which has evolved over many years under the Convention and its Kyoto Proto
col.   
The 1st Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol is about to come to an end.  The question 
that has been left unanswered from Bali is the 2nd Commitment period.  
This has now become dependent on the decision on the legal nature of the outcome of the n
egotiations under the Convention. It is also clear that if this question is not resolved, the outc
ome on other matters will become extremely difficult.   
In order to find a solution, Parties need to be re‐
assured that should some of them  commit to a 2nd Commitment Period under the Kyoto Pro
tocol in a legally binding manner, others would be ready to commit to a legally binding regim
e in the near future.    
Underlying this request for re‐
assurance is the insistence that all Parties will  implement the obligations and commitments 
previously undertaken, and that all will share the load to address the problem.   
Parties also need assurances that adequate and sustainable long term funding will be  
delivered, and that the implementation of all agreements will continue without an  implement
ation gap occurring.  
Excellencies,  
Ladies and gentlemen,  
We need to make a decision here in Durban that includes both the now and future  
aspects of these re‐
assurances that are needed.  On the now and immediate, we need to agree on the adoption 
of a 2nd Commitment  Period of the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the possibility of enhanced m
echanisms and  to decide on the eligibility for participation in these enhanced mechanisms.   
Such an agreement should entail the adoption of an amendment of Annexure B of  the Kyoto
 Protocol with re‐
assurances that Parties will implement the amendment domestically by the end of 2012.  We
 must also agree on the formalization and implementation of the mitigation pledges of develo
ped countries and the rules of comparability between the pledges of those Parties of the Kyo
to Protocol and those Parties outside the Kyoto Protocol.  
Therefore, the rulesto assure comparability need to be finalized as soon as possible.  
An Agreement on adaptation, the establishment of the Green Climate Fund, finance, 
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technology transfer and capacity building must also be part of the agreement in  
Durban.   
 
For the future, Parties need to pronounce on the legal nature of the outcome of the  
future multilateral rules based system.   
 
This should be done in a manner that would be equal in nature to those decided on  
the 2nd Commitment Period.   
 
In this future multilateral rules’ based system, the level of ambition and the fact that  
all Parties will collectively have to do more, will have to be addressed.   
 
We wish to underscore the point that developed countries have the responsibility to  
take the lead in addressing the climate change challenge.   
 
They must lead the global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. And they  
must also lead through providing support to developing countries in their mitigation  
actions and efforts to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change.   
 
This is consistent with the principle of common but differentiated responsibility  
enshrined in the international convention on climate change.   
 
It is common knowledge that developed countries benefitted from a high level of  
emissions for their own development.   
 
It is therefore fair that developing countries be provided developmental space in a  
sustainable way so that they too may develop and eradicate the poverty that  
continues to afflict their people.  
 
We must agree that all Parties, will have to do more to reach the agreed long‐term  
global goal of limiting average temperature increase to below 2 degrees Celsius.  
We must agree as well, that the international community must honour the  
international commitments and undertakings made under the climate change  
process and not to shy away from these decisions.   
 
Parties must secure an enhanced multilateral rules‐
based response to climate change that is equally binding on all.  Therefore, a process needs
 to be established for which the 2013‐2015 review could provide valuable input.   
 
This process should also take into account what science prescribes, as well as the  
outcome of the 5th Inter‐Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report and  
other work that would have been done, under the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long‐ 
term Cooperative Action under the Convention and the Subsidiary Bodies.    
Parties have to consider the type of process that will be required and a specific  
timeframe to conclude the work.   
 
The objective would be for the multilateral rules based system, binding on all Parties, 
to be implemented by no later than 2020.  
 
Colleagues Heads of States and Government and representatives,  
Esteemed participants,  
Let me briefly name two other crucial elements, namely; adaptation and finance.  Real action
 on adaptation is an essential element of the outcome. It is also a key  priority for many devel
143 
 
oping countries, particularly Small Island Developing States, Least Developed Countries and
 the African continent.  The time has come for the world to move away from analysis, study a
nd research, to identifying practical adaptation actions that can be implemented on the groud
.    
 
There can be no dispute that research and analysis are important aspects of  
adaptation actions. However, we now need more practical action.  In this regard, the Adaptat
ion Committee must be constituted. Its functions must be decided upon so that it can begin it
s work.   
 
The Adaptation Committee should play an important role in bringing into focus, in a  
coherent and holistic manner, what needs to be done as far as adaptation is  
concerned.The committee must bring an end to the current fragmented approach to adaptati
on in the Convention.    
 
The link with the funding, technology transfer, mechanisms and networks and capacity buildi
ng for real and tangible adaptation actions must be established. This will give effect to the ag
reement that equal priority must be given to adaptation and smitigation.  
 
And ladies and gentlemen,  
 
The Green Climate Fund (GCF) represents a centre piece for a broader set of  
outcomes for Durban. Developing countries demand a prompt start for the Fund  
through its early and initial capitalization.   
 
The early capitalization of the Fund  and the issue of long term funding present a  
significant political challenge, given the current economic situation in many  
developed countries which, of course, is fully appreciated.  
  
Another challenge to overcome is the lack of confidence from developing countries  
in the delivery and transparency of the pledged Fast Start Finance.  
 
I am confident that all Parties will make a special effort and show the required  
leadership to creatively provide these assurances that can lead to consensus on all  
the outstanding issues.   There is a lot of work to be done this week,to bring the work of 
Durban to a fruitful and successful conclusion.  
I wish the parties well during this final push towards a meaningful outcome in  
Durban.  
It is only by working together that we will be able to save tomorrow today.   




Date: 6 December 2011 
 
Opening remarks by President Jacob Zuma to the 3rd Nobel Laureate Symposium on Global 
Sustainability – Transforming the world in an era of global change, Inkosi Albert Luthuli ICC, 




06 December 2011 
 
Excellencies Heads of State and Government, 
Prof Johan Rockström, Chair of the 3rd Nobel Laureate Symposium on Global Sustainability, 
Ministers, 
Ambassadors, 
Ladies and gentlemen, 
It is indeed an honor for me to welcome you to this august gathering of Laureates, state 
leaders, ministers and other distinguished participants, to discuss global sustainability and 
related solutions to climate change. 
This UN climate change conference in Durban, COP 17/CMP7 is all the richer because of 
your attendance and participation. 
Many of you have made an invaluable contribution to the upliftment of humanity and in the 
protection and sustainable use of our environment.  
As COP17/CMP7 President, South Africa fully supports the Nobel Laureate Symposium in 
its dialogue with the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Global Sustainability. 
This symposium is very important to members of the UN SG’s panel as obtaining the views 
of a distinguished gathering like this one will certainly add value to our work. 
Esteemed members; 
Humanity has never been so profoundly aware of climate change, its impact and the 
necessity to radically reduce the emissions to save the next generations. 
The developing world and Africa in particular are hardest-hit by climate change. 
Apart from the climate change impact such as sea-level rise, severe droughts and floods, 
Africa’s vulnerability also arises from the prevailing dismal levels of poverty, which limit the 
continent’s ability to cope with the adverse effects. 
The effects, as we know, are always manifold and unfortunately, also include the recurrent 
resource-induced conflicts such as we have seen in the Sudan over grazing land. 
As we have always emphasized, a global multilateral response grounded in the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities will be the only effective 
and sustainable answer to this pressing global challenge. 
 
In this regard this COP17 conference presents us with an opportunity to shape the future 




None is better placed than you therefore, leaders in the field of humanity, with your proven 
and tested credentials, to provide visionary direction. 
Given the difficult global economic climate, we are fully aware that countries are concerned 
that decisions taken at the climate change negotiations could hamper their economic 
development. 
We feel strongly therefore, that sustainable development and economics should be at the 
heart of the climate change discussions. 
We have also always maintained that without multilateral rules-based system there can be 
no guarantee that countries will honour their commitments. 
Colleagues and friends, 
There are a number of issues currently on the table for discussion as you would have been 
briefed by respective delegations. 
Finance remains one of the key issues, not only for a comprehensive climate deal, but also 
to place the global community on a path that will allow us to build resilient societies. 
With reference to future actions, it remains of critical importance that the level of ambition 
should correspond to the demands of science. 
Any agreement on a future response should also take into account what science prescribes, 
as well as the outcome of the 5th report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). 
It is here where Parties have to consider a definite timeframe for concluding the work that 
forms part of the agreement on future actions within the multilateral rules-based system 
which should be  implemented by no later than 2020. 
More importantly, as you are aware, action on adaptation is an essential element and a key 
priority for many developing countries, particularly Small Island Developing States, Least 
Developed Countries and the African continent. 
Therefore, the operationalisation of the Adaptation Committee is urgent, considering its role 
in enhancing coherence and agreeing on activities for the next phase of the Nairobi Work 
Programme. 
The need for dedicated financing to be made available for adaptation programmes and 
assistance will continue to be of critical importance in all future climate change negotiations. 
We therefore urgently require a formula that will reflect these elements in a manner that can 
provide the required re-assurances of the commitment and full participation of all Parties, 
developed and developing, in the current and evolving climate change system.  
Such a formula is achievable, but it will require leadership and pragmatism from all sides. 
I am personally of the view that with the necessary political will, there is a window of 
opportunity to find this delicate formula that would safeguard the many gains. 
This opportunity should not be missed. 
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It is also important to think beyond our national interests in these negotiations, no matter 
how difficult that may be.  That is always the area where sound leadership is needed so that 
we can harmonise engagements beyond existing entrenched positions. 
Developing countries fear that their economic and social development could be hampered by 
countries which have the greatest historical responsibility for current concentrations of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.  
At the same time, the share of global emissions of greenhouse gases originating in 
developing countries is growing rapidly, as they expand their industries to improve social and 
economic conditions for their citizens. 
As climate change is a global problem, every country must assume responsibility to play its 
part in contributing to the solution. 
That way we will be able to find solutions. 
The developed world must continue to take the lead. On the other hand, the developing 
countries must show a willingness to take their fair share of responsibilities, keeping in mind 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, to deal with the challenge of climate 
change. 
The outcome of this balance must address the urgent need of humanity as it is already 
suffering the effects of climate change. 
The outcome must also address natural resource management, and advocate for institutions 
that will integrate these issues of development and natural environment. 
Also important is food security, and other concerns as articulated in the Millennium 
Development Goals. 
Esteemed colleagues and friends, 
Ladies and gentlemen; 
Many people have referred to this Conference as an “African COP”. It is no coincidence that 
this event of Nobel Laureates is taking place in the Africa Pavilion. 
We are happy indeed that you have decided to contribute your collective wisdom to one of 
the most defining issues of our time on African soil. 
At the same time, I need to remind you that this is not the first COP on the African Continent. 
However, there is a particular way in which the African continent looks at this event. 
We want you to feel the spirit of Africa and the warmth, and use it to develop strong 
partnerships to take forward the mammoth task of dealing with climate change and ensuring 
global sustainability. 
This event is not like the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup tournament that we proudly hosted, 
where only a few soccer teams qualified, with one ultimate winner. 
All countries have qualified to participate and all should be able to emerge here as winners. 
According to your programme, you will continue with extensive deliberations on possible 
solutions for what we need to do NOW and what we agree to do in the FUTURE.I wish you 
all the best with those discussions. 
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As our message at this COP states, it is only by working together that we can truly save 
tomorrow today! 





Date: 7 December 2011 
 
Address by President Jacob Zuma on the occasion of the COP 17 High Level Side 
Event on Climate-smart Agriculture, Durban 






Ladies and Gentlemen, 
It is generally accepted that by 2050, there will be more than nine billion people in the world. 
If this is true, agricultural production must increase by 70 percent in order to feed our 
growing population. Agriculture is more vulnerable to climate change than any other sector.  
Climate changes create risks and uncertainty with potentially serious downsides.  Without 
strong adaptation measures, climate change could reduce food crop production by 10 to 20 
percent by the 2050s, with more severe losses in Africa. 
Climate-smart agriculture seeks to enhance agricultural productivity by improving on 
resilience. Farmers should be at the centre of this transformation of the agriculture sector.  
Improved agricultural practices have the potential to increase crop yields, diversify income 
sources and reduce the vulnerability of small farmers to climate change. 
Climate-smart agriculture includes proven practical techniques – such as mulching, 
intercropping, conservation agriculture, crop rotation, integrated crop-livestock management, 
agro-forestry, improved grazing, and improved water management – and innovative 
practices such as better weather forecasting, more resilient food crops, and risk insurance. 
No one knows exactly how the future global climate will develop and what the resultant 
consequences will be to all of us particularly the developing and poor countries, but impacts 
could be considerable. 
Food security, especially in Africa, is linked to the prevailing climate. 
Any long or short term changes thereof are paramount to our ability to feed our nations with 
high quality, affordable and accessible staple foods. Food security is important to Africa's 
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economy as it impacts heavily on the countries’ poverty alleviation and sustainable 
development plans, including Millennium Development Goals. 
Agriculture has a huge potential to cost-effectively reduce greenhouse gases through 
changes in agricultural technologies and management practices, in particular in developed 
countries.  Improvements in water conservation and demand management and its spatial 
distribution, will intensify the need for safer water purification, storage, and management. 
Equally important is supporting innovative institutional mechanisms that give agricultural 
water users incentives to conserve. Investments in rural infrastructure, both physical (such 
as roads, market buildings, and storage facilities) and institutional (such as extension 
programs, credit and input markets, and reduced barriers to internal trade) are needed to 
enhance the resilience of agriculture in the face of the doubts of climate change. 
We need to link climate change, food security and poverty;  we  need to engage on 
emerging issues including finance and technological support and approaches such as 
Climate-Smart Agriculture that are geared towards addressing food security, adaptation and 
mitigation. 
Research must help us to identify early actions and best practices to build capacity and 
increase resilience and carbon sequestration, while enhancing and ensuring food security. 
Current and on-going awareness programmes should assist the farming communities to put 
into place best farming practices which will promote sustainable agriculture and thereby 
contributing towards the green economy. 
The ruin of natural resources (land, water, and biological diversity) threatens the livelihoods 
of the poor, particularly in rural areas, where they rely heavily on them. Increasing poverty, in 
turn, limits the range of available options with regard to the sustainable management of 
these finite resources. The exhaustion of natural resources contributes directly to the 
scourge of climate change. 
The African continent is one of those continents which will be badly affected by climate 
change. In spite of recent economic growth in many countries of the region, poverty 
continues to be Africa’s overwhelming development challenge. 
This is associated in most cases with insufficient access to modern energy and other basic 
infrastructure like safe drinking water and sanitation, irrigation for crops and well-maintained 
rural roads. In the coming decades, in an effort to meet the Millennium Development Goals 
on poverty and hunger, the agriculture need to develop and grow at an exceptional absolute 
rate involving intensification of crop and animal production. 
While this growth must target the needs of increasing population, it will certainly put an extra 
pressure on agricultural lands and will have to be achieved against reduced water 
availability, in particular in the agriculture-based economies. Good farming practices follow 
ecosystem-based approaches designed to improve sustainability of crop-livestock 
production systems, aiming to meet consumer needs for high quality, safe products 
produced in an environmentally and socially responsible way. 
Evidence suggests that market incentives and the right mix of policy instruments can 
improve sustainable farming practices and farmers’ incomes. Governments should consider 
promoting organic farming systems. Organic agriculture has a smaller footprint on the 
natural resource base and the health of agricultural workers than conventional agriculture. 
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In short, Food security, poverty and climate change are closely linked and should not be 
considered separately. Climate-smart agriculture offers a “triple win” for food security, 
adaptation, and mitigation. 
Climate-smart farming techniques such as mulching, crop remainder management, and soil 
and water conservation measures, can increase farm productivity and incomes, and make 
agriculture more resilient to climate change, while also contributing to mitigation.  
Adaptation enhances food security and can potentially contribute to reducing agriculture’s 
greenhouse gas emissions.  Strong adaptation measures, as well as the financing required 
to support them, are essential if we are to reach our poverty alleviation and food security 
goals. We should not separate agricultural productivity, strengthening farmers’ resilience to 
climate change and take away carbon. Many programs across the globe as well as here in 
Africa have applied this integrated approach. 
This COP 17 meeting represents a unique opportunity for Africa to shape the global climate 
agenda and strengthen the focus  on climate change and agriculture through a work 
program on adaptation, and a separate work program on mitigation, both of which  must be 
are informed by science. 
Climate-smart agriculture  provides for an environmentally sound and affordable way for 
smallholders to intensify production in marginal areas and offers promising export 
opportunities for developing countries which have in many cases an inherent comparative 
advantage due to relatively abundant labour supply and relatively low use of agro-chemicals. 
Several studies show that the use of organic methods of farming by small producers in 
developing countries can lead to an increase in crop yields and thus enhance food security 
among the poor. Sustainable crop and livestock systems provide ecosystem services that 
restore productivity, conserve soil, water and biodiversity, take away carbon, regulate 
climate and provide landscape and cultural values. 
Policies that address the drivers of land ruin and build capacities at all levels for sustainable 
land use and wide adoption of sustainable land management practices need to be 
developed and adapted to local circumstances. It is equally important to provide incentives 
for producers to encourage sustainable farming practices and investments in soil 
conservation and water use efficiency. 
These are some of the reasons why countries of the world should consider adopting climate-
smart agriculture or sustainable agriculture as some of us call it. Climate-smart agriculture 
seeks to increase sustainable productivity, strengthen farmers’ resilience, reduce 
agriculture’s greenhouse gas emissions and increase carbon sequestration. It strengthens 
food security and delivers environmental benefits. 
Governments can direct public investments, institutional reforms, and development 
programs towards smallholders in ways that encourage further public and private agricultural 
and rural development investments.  
Investments in agriculture development and incentives provided to local farmers must be 
complemented by macro-economic policies to ensure sustainability. Investments in core 
public goods, science, infrastructure, and human capital, combined with better policies and 
institutions, are major drivers of agricultural productivity growth. 
It is clear that climate change poses a serious threat not only to agricultural production but 
the economy as a whole. By tackling climate change in a coordinated effort we will increase 
the positive spin-offs and benefits to the agricultural communities and economy. 
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Thank you once again for the opportunity to address you on this important topic, during 
these critical discussions on saving humanity and the future. 




Date: 8 December 2011 
Address by President Jacob Zuma at the launch of COP 17 Legacy Projects in Groutville, 
KwaZulu-Natal 
08 December 2011 
Honourable Premier,  
Ministers and Deputy Ministers, 
Mayors and councilors, 
Representatives of United Nations agencies, 
Representatives of the private sector, 
 
Good afternoon to you all. 
We meet in Groutville, a town that is home to one of the most outstanding leaders of our 
country and continent, Chief Albert Luthuli. 
This visionary, who was a president general of the African National Congress, was the first 
South African to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. 
He left behind a rich political legacy and a collection of wisdom that we continue to draw 
from each day, as we work to build a better Africa and a better world. 
The 17th conference of the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, COP 17 is meeting at the Inkosi Albert Luthuli Convention Centre, named after this 
great South African hero. 
It is befitting therefore, that we come to Groutville to pay our respects to his memory and 
legacy. 
Last week, the family buried his son, Mr Sulenkosi Luthuli. We extend our deepest 
condolences to the family during this sad time. 
Ladies and gentlemen, 
One of South Africa’s major challenges for poverty eradication particularly in the rural 
communities is access to electricity. 
People have to burn wood and coal to get some sort of energy which causes health-related 
problems such as pneumonia and asthma. 
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Further economic consequences include productive time consumed by collecting wood, and 
the costs of achieving energy security can be expensive. 
Environmental consequences are equally concerning, with deforestation and local air 
pollution being the typical outcomes of reliance on natural and fossil fuels for energy. 
We are working on solutions already. 
Today we launch the pilot project to tackle energy access in rural areas  which has been 
made possible through a partnership between the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), its 
implementing agency, the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO). 
They have been working with additional support from the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), and their South African partners, the Departments of Energy and 
Environmental Affairs. 
This approach complements the country’s move towards improving the energy efficiency of 
existing applications and ensuring that a greater proportion of the energy mix is comprised of 
renewable sources, as a sustainable and climate-friendly approach to energy security for all. 
Nineteen (19) clinics in KwaZulu-Natal are being retrofitted with solar water heaters, which 
include the clinic here in Groutville, KwaDukuza Local Municipality, which is part of the 
iLembe District Municipality. In addition to the installation of the solar water heaters at the 
clinic, solar water heaters have also been installed at the two primary schools, Dr Vilakazi 
Primary and Aldinville Primary as well as boundary lighting at Dr Vilakazi Primary. 
A select number of households in close proximity to the clinic are also recipients of 
renewable energy and energy efficient technologies. 
Thanks to one of the project sponsors, these households have now received energy efficient 
cooking stoves together with solar powered torches, lanterns and energy efficient indoor 
lighting. 
The impact of this intervention will be the reduced use of carbon-intensive electricity from the 
grid as well as reduced timber and coal for heating and cooking. 
This will contribute to the scale up of greater use of solar-powered sources of energy. 
This intervention will also address the health implications associated with the burning of 
timber and coal; the costs associated with buying electricity and coal; and the productivity 
losses in collecting timber for energy purposes. 
We congratulate all partners in this important project. 
Ladies and gentlemen, 
We have a second announcement to make here in Groutville. 
At the COP17 talks last week, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and the 
Economic Development Department opened a pledge challenge to companies, trade unions 
and individuals to make a financial pledge to install solar water heaters on the rooftops of a 
number of houses in Groutville, home of Chief Albert Luthuli. 
This is a tribute to his contribution to the country and the world, and also as a legacy of 
COP17 to the people of this province. 
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The response has been excellent. Companies, workers and even school children have made 
contributions. We have in 10 days raised money and matching grants for installing solar 
water heaters in 500 homes, which will bring hot water to more than 3 000 residents. 
We thank all who contributed to this wonderful and innovative project. 
 
More details will be made available tomorrow morning by the Minister of Economic 
Development at the COP17 venue in Durban. 
Ladies and gentlemen, 
Today has been an important occasion. 
We have launched a multi-lateral commitment to advancing integrated energy solutions to 
rural communities. 
The interventions announced today will ease energy poverty while addressing the country’s 
development goals without compromising the environment. 
The people of Groutville and surroundings will always remember COP 17 as the UN climate 
change conference that brought a difference to their lives in practical terms. 
We will continue building on this path towards a sustainable, environmentally friendly future. 




2009 – COP 15 
Address by President Jacob Zuma at UN Climate Change Conference, Copenhagen, 
18 December 2009 
http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2009/jzum1221.html 
Excellencies, Your Majesties, 
We have all gathered here because we understand the enormous challenge we face as a 
result of climate change. 
A lot of work has been done over a period of time by our negotiators as well as the United 
Nations to assist the world to reach agreement. 
Climate change is a practical matter for the developing world, especially Africa.  
For countries such as South Africa, weather patterns in coastal provinces are already 




We came here knowing that reaching an agreement would be critical for future generations 
to avoid fundamental and irreversible changes in climate.  
We knew that the outcome of this Conference would have to give effect to the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibility enshrined in the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change.  
Some facts are already well known. Developed countries are historically responsible for 80 
percent of the current emissions in the atmosphere. 
Developing countries are most affected by climate change. 
As they justifiably pursue their own development paths, it is expected that developing 
countries’ emissions will increase. 
In the long-term, we need an agreement that recognises the common responsibility of all 
nations to reduce emissions, while not retarding the development of developing countries. 
Our view remains that all developed countries must commit to ambitious, legally binding 
emission reduction targets, in with historical responsibility and in line with needs of science. 
Developing countries should commit to nationally appropriate mitigation action, to achieve a 
decline in emissions relative to business as usual. 
This would be conditional on finance, technology and capacity building support from 
developed countries.  
Developing countries are ready to play their part in reducing global emissions, but obviously 
rich countries have to take the lead. 
With financial and technological support from developed countries, South Africa for example 
will be able to reduce emissions by 34% below ‘business as usual’ levels by 2020 and by 
42% by 2025. 
We wanted a complete, legally binding agreement, but accept the progress that has been 
made in COP 15. 
We support the fact that parties will continue negotiating two complementary binding 
instruments: one under the UN Convention and one under the Kyoto Protocol.  
We have made progress in that we have been able to isolate the areas of agreement and 
disagreement. 
We need to move with speed to finalise the areas of disagreement, in order to conclude a 
legally binding agreement for the sake of future generations. 
We, the leaders of the world, need to seize our historical responsibility to act now to 
safeguard the future of humanity and the planet it inhabits. 
We owe it to current and future generations. 







2010 – COP 16 
 
Closing remarks by President Jacob Zuma to the Heads of State and Government 
Dialogue at the UNFCC climate change conference, Cancun, Mexico, 9 DECEMBER 
2010. 
"THE STRUGGLE AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE: WHAT SHOULD OUR LEGACY BE” 
Excellency President Felipe Calderon, 
Excellencies Heads of State and Government, 
Honourable Ministers, 
We congratulate our colleague and friend, President Calderon for the successful 
organization of this important conference, and also the outstanding hospitality extended to 
our delegations. 
As the hosts of the next round of talks, the 17th Conference of the Parties to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, in Durban next year, we have learned a 
lot from Mexico. 
Our participation here is valuable indeed and we appreciate the offers of support from the 
Mexicans and other nations. 
The theme of this Leader's Dialogue places a heavy responsibility on us as leaders to look to 
the future. It enjoins us to think now about how future generations will judge us, based on 
our response to the challenge of climate change. 
The world is waiting for good news and progress to emerge from these negotiations. They 
look up to us to come up with meaningful solutions. 
The Bali Roadmap set the two track framework for negotiations under the Convention and its 
Kyoto Protocol, in accordance with the principles of equity and common but differentiated 
responsibility and respective capability. 
We dare not delay.  
The climate is changing and regions such as Africa and small island states are becoming 
more vulnerable as we spend hours, months and years deliberating. 
Drought in Africa, flooding in the Phillipines, Pakistan and China, wild fires in Russia and 
other parts of the world are warnings of what lies ahead if we do not act sooner. 
It is estimated that in some African countries yields from rain-fed agriculture could be 
reduced by up to 50% in the next 20 years.  
In addition, between seventy five and two hundred and fifty million people are projected to be 
exposed to increased water stress by 2020. 
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Health impacts will also magnify the challenges of food and water insecurity. Increasing 
strain on the resilience of many ecosystems will affect the livelihoods of people living in rural 
areas. 
Considering that the effect of climate change is already felt by most developing countries, it 
is important that urgent steps be taken to help them adapt to as well as mitigate the impact 
of climate change.  
The Copenhagen Accord provides political direction in this respect by encouraging 
developed countries to provide adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources, 
technology and capacity building for adaptation action in developing countries.  
The Cancun negotiations must help us move forward.  
The talks have to produce a multilateral climate change regime that is fair, inclusive and 
effective, keeping temperature to well below two degrees celcius above pre-industrial levels.  
In fact more recent science indicates that one point five degrees celsius is the safe limit. 
We also urge that the multilateral climate change regime must strike a balance between 
climate and development imperatives. It must also not jeopardize economic growth and 
poverty eradication priorities of developing countries. 
Through our actions, we also need to respond to the notion that there is a trade-off to be 
made between faster economic growth and the preservation of our environment.  
We must prove that faster economic growth can be achieved alongside the sustainable 
management of our natural resources. 
That is the route we are following in South Africa. We are exploring further the concept of 
'green jobs', including scaling up labour-intensive natural resource management practices 
which contribute to decent work and livelihood opportunities. 
We are in particular, amongst others, pursuing investments in projects and industries in the 
fields of renewable energy, marine aquaculture development, wildlife management, waste 
services as well as ecosystems rehabilitation programmes.  
There are many other initiatives that industrialized nations can pursue and which some are 
pursuing already to protect the future, while not destroying industries and jobs.We 
emphasise the view that the multilateral climate change regime must proactively support 
sustainable development by enabling a transition to a low carbon economy, and an equal 
balance of emphasis on adaptation and mitigation. 
This can be achieved by ensuring that adaptation is recognized as an international 
responsibility requiring an international legal framework, to enable and support the 
implementation of large scale adaption programmes at international, regional and national 
levels. 
As agreed in Bali, the most effective and politically acceptable way to urgently deliver on 
these requirements is through an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol to establish a second 




We strongly believe that we must leave Cancun having agreed on the over-arching decisions 
on the legal form of the eventual outcome of negotiations under the Convention and the 
continued negotiation of a 2nd Commitment Period under the Kyoto Protocol. 
There must also be decisions on a roadmap and timelines for further negotiations as well as 
decisions to support implementation in the short term. 
This will enable Durban to build on what has been achieved in Cancun, and to ensure that 
future generations inherit a world that is sustainable and climate resilient. 
Working together we can do more. 
Acting now costs far less than acting later 
